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1. Origin, objectives and underlying philosophy of the moral 
rights in the Netherlands. 
 
 
This part will be split in a paragraph concerning the origin (A) and a short comment on the objectives 
and underlying philosophy (B).  
 
In paragraph (a), Origin of the moral right in the Netherlands, first a general characteristic will be 
sketched which attempts to summarize the ‘spirit’ of the Dutch doctrine on moral rights in a few key 
words (i). Under the second heading, ‘legislative history’, the legislative evolution will be dealt with. 
This allows to highlight  the long term evolution of the moral right in the Netherlands. Apart from 
that, in the earlier era of development of the moral right the legislator sometimes took a synthetic 
approach of several aspects of the moral right at the same time. It is therefore more practical to deal 
with those issues in a general chapter.  
 
When dealing with Question 2 of the Questionnaire, concerning the individual categories of moral 
rights, the development of the individual rights is commented in the light of case law and academic 
doctrine. In this way, the answers to Question 1 and 2 form an integrated whole. 
 
 
 
a. The origin 
 
 
(i) General features of the Dutch moral right. 
 
Moral rights in the system of the Copyright Act 
In the system of the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912, the moral rights of Article 25 – the rights of 
paternity and the integrity - are treated as exceptions to the exploitation right. 
 
Moderately dualistic approach 
Discussions about the monist or dualist nature of copyright have hardly been played a role. 
The prevailing opinion seems to be that the Dutch system should be characterized as 
moderately dualistic. It is however no point of discussion that moral rights can be used in 
order to defend commercial interests.  
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Between droit d’auteur and Copyright 
The spirit of the Copyright Act 1912 predominantly was of a droit d’auteur nature. In some 
regards the system tends towards solutions based on a common law/copyright approach. 
This notably is the case where, according to Article 7 Copyright Act, the employer is 
considered to be the maker of works created by an employee in the execution of his duties. 
This issue also concerns the moral right, as part of the jurisprudence infers from the fact that 
the employer is qualified as maker, that the moral rights must also be vested in the 
employer. However, there is far from unanimity on this topic – although literature 
sometimes suggests otherwise – and in the more than a century old history of the copyright 
Act, the Dutch Supreme Court has never been called to decide on the issue. Otherwise, the 
moral rights by their nature mainly are a droit d’auteur issue. It nevertheless strikes that the 
Netherlands put strong emphasis on the practicability and reasonability of the results of the 
exercise of the moral rights. This applies to the legislative level as well as to the application 
by the judicature.      
 
Reasonableness 
Concerned about the needs of practice and apprehensive of fundamentalist excrescences of 
the moral right, the Dutch put great emphasis on the need that the exercise of the moral 
right must remain within the limits of reasonableness. The legislator submits the exercise to 
a test of reasonableness, either directly or via the additional requirement that a violation of 
the right must be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the maker. The jurisprudence 
follows the same direction. However, it would not be correct to state that as a consequence 
of this, the moral right is reduced over its full width. If, in certain cases, the courts find a 
violation of the moral right for which there exists no sufficient justification, the right my 
‘show its teeth’ and will be enforced, even where this may have drastic social or financial 
consequences.  
 
The role of jurisprudence and doctrine in the field of moral rights  
The influence of judge-made law on the exercise of moral rights today seems the most 
important factor in the development of moral rights in the Netherlands. Although the 
Copyright Act of 1912 recognized moral rights and even the Act of 1881 contained features 
of them from the start, it was not until half a century later that gradually, a body of 
jurisprudence began to develop. As from the eighties, the volume of case law in the field of 
moral rights grew sharply. At an academic level, the attention given to moral rights was not 
always exuberant. In some cases this may have been inspired by the tacit conviction that the 
whole institution of moral rights was an outdated, somewhat sentimental curiosity, the role 
of which should as much as possible be reduced under a modern copyright doctrine. As a 
result, to a great extent the doctrine of the moral right might be characterized as genuinely 
judge-made. If good or even influential academic comments have been written, their guiding 
role may have been modest in comparison to other parts of copyright.  
The number of decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) dealing with moral rights 
in the strict sense presently is limited to only four,
1
 to which should however be added some 
                                                           
1
 Dutch Supreme Court 29 May 1987, Struycken and Unger v. Riet, about the integrity right; Dutch Supreme 
Court 6 February 2004, Jelles v. Zwolle (‘destruction of the Wavin-building’), LJN AN7830; AMI 2004, p. 140-
152, note Seignette; IER 2004, nr 19, p 102-119, note Grosheide. 
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highly relevant decisions that deal with the moral rights issue from the angle of general 
private law (see below). However, there is a considerable body of decisions of lower courts. 
 
Supplementary role of general private law 
A striking feature is that from the earliest beginning of moral rights jurisprudence, moral 
rights protection by copyright has constantly been supplemented by private law solutions, 
found in particular in the law of obligations and in the general doctrine on unlawful acts. 
Frequently general private law even provides protection for interests copyright hesitates to 
underwrite. In certain experimental cases, where the courts might be in doubt as to the 
frontal application of the official doctrine of the ‘absolute’ moral right, they are willing to 
apply general private law without a shade of hesitation – essentially to the same result as 
would have been reached under the heading of the authors’ moral rights. This refutes 
ingrained prejudices that the moral right would be some singularity for which no support 
could be found in the ‘real’ legal world outside copyright.  
 
Continuing importance of the doctrine of general private law 
Although the evolution of copyright has brought the moral right provisions to full life, the 
dialogue between general private law and moral rights doctrine is far from being closed, as 
can and will be buttressed hereunder by many examples. In the mid-eighties, when the 
development of an independent moral rights jurisprudence and doctrine was already in full 
swing, C.J.H. Brunner, the authoritative commentator on the law of obligations in the leading 
journal Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ), wrote in a note
2
 that ‘the description of the moral 
rights in Article 25 Copyright Act [had] no other significance than that of a closer specification 
of the respect which is owed to the maker of the work by virtue of the requirements of 
reasonableness and fairness (and – as far as third parties were concerned – by virtue of the 
standards of due care which must be observed in society).’  
 
A moral ‘right to exposure’ developing under private law?  
A more experimental doctrine developed in private law confirms that under circumstances, 
an author may have a (moral) interest in that his or her work is realized and communicated 
to the public. One could link this to another, meanwhile firmly established feature in the 
Dutch moral rights doctrine: the economic function of the right of paternity. The interest that 
the name of the author is known with the public is not so far from the interest that his work 
is known to the public. Perhaps we are witness to the gradual recognition of an ‘interest in 
“exposure” of the work’. Support for this could be found in some rather interesting case law 
of the Dutch Supreme Court of the last decades. 
 
Literature 
Various overviews in the English language on the moral right in the Netherlands and its 
evolution are available.
3
 
                                                           
2
 C.J.H. Brunner in NJ 1986, 692. 
3
 Herman Cohen Jehoram, Jan Kabel, Jeroen Arnolds, in: Jan Corbet, Fabienne Brison, Hendrik Vanhees, Guido 
Peeters (eds), Le droit moral de l’auteur, Congrès d’Anvers, ALAI 1993/The moral right of the author, Congress 
of Antwerp, ALAI 1993, respectively p. 179-185, 385-395, 455-459; Herman Cohen Jehoram and Mireille van 
Eechoud, Netherlands, §7, Moral Right, in: Paul Edward Geller (ed.), International Copyright Law and Practice; 
Eltjo J.H. Schrage, ‘The Payer Determines, or Does He?’, in: B. Demarsin, EJH Schrage, B Tilleman & A Verbeke 
(eds), Art & Law, Brugge: Die Keure 2008, p. 200-229; F.W. Grosheide, ‘The Netherlands’, in: Gillian Davies, Kevin 
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(ii) The legislative history: tracing the sources of the moral rights provisions
4
  
 
The origin of the moral rights in the modern sense in Dutch law lies no doubt in the Copyright 
Act of 1912. However, the Act of 1881 contained some precursors of the moral right which 
are interesting enough to mention. 
 
Copyright Act of 1881: obligation to mention the source, immunity of copyright for seizure  
 
The Act of 1881
5
 did not provide moral rights; even in countries much ahead of the 
Netherlands, the concept of the moral right was still in statu nascendi. Nevertheless, two 
interesting observations can be made. 
 
Obligation to mention the source 
“Provided that the source is mentioned”, Article 7(2) of the same Act of 1881 allowed to 
further publish by print news and articles from daily and weekly papers unless the copyright 
was expressly reserved in the head of the article and the work was duly registered. Is it a first 
precursor of the right of paternity introduced in 1912? As Henri Louis de Beaufort argued in 
1909, this right could not be explained as a corollary of the (commercial) copyright. Indeed, 
the obligation to mention the source applied in the case in which the reservation of the 
copyright and/or the registration with the Ministry of Justice had been neglected and 
therefore, no commercial copyright in the work was granted.
6
 
 
Immunity for seizure and right of divulgation 
More importantly, Article 9, par. 3 of the Dutch Copyright Act 1881 declared that copyright 
was not eligible for seizure. In his influential thesis of 1909, Henri Louis de Beaufort fleshed 
out the question whether there was a relation between the rule of immunity for seizure  and 
the concept of the right of divulgation.
7
 As in the Netherlands, the right of divulgation (and 
certainly the relation between that right and the immunity for seizure) has not always 
received great attention, this will be elaborated on somewhat more.  
 
De Beaufort considers that only as far as it concerns works as not yet exploited (divulged) by 
the author, the right of divulgation is at stake, for the new publication will have 
consequences the reputation as a scholar or an artist for which he will have to bear the full 
responsibility. However, in case the author has already exploited the work or has given the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Garnett (eds), Moral Rights, London: Sweet & Maxwell, Thomson Reuters, p. 481-504, at 482; Jan J.C. Kabel and 
Antoon A. Quaedvlieg, Moral Rights, in : Bernt Hugenholtz, Antoon Quaedvlieg, Dirk Visser, A Century of Dutch 
Copyright Law. Auteurswet 1912-2012, Amsterdam: deLex 2012, p. 308-358.   
4
 This part on the legislative history is in large part based on the contribution of Jan J.C. Kabel in : Bernt 
Hugenholtz, Antoon Quaedvlieg, Dirk Visser, A Century of Dutch Copyright Law. Auteurswet 1912-2012, 
Amsterdam: deLex 2012, p. 309-319 
5
 M. Reinsma, Auteurswet 1881. Parlementaire geschiedenis wet 1881 – ontwerp 1884, Walburg Pers: Zutphen 
2006, p. 86; J.J.C. Kabel in : J.J.C. Kabel and A.A. Quaedvlieg, Moral Rights, in: Bernt Hugenholtz, Antoon 
Quaedvlieg, Dirk Visser, A Century of Dutch Copyright Law. Auteurswet 1912-2012., Amsterdam: deLex 2012, p. 
308-358, at p. 312 
6
 H.L. de Beaufort, Het Auteursrecht in het Nederlandsche en internationale recht, thesis at the Faculty of Law of 
the University of Utrecht, P. den Boer Utrecht 1909, republished in facsimile in 1993 on commission of BUMA 
by WC den Ouden in Amsterdam, with a preface by F.W. Grosheide 
7
 P. 281 ff. 
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work free for publication
8
 there is no reason why the creditors would be prevented to seek 
recovery on the copyright. Let alone, De Beaufort added, if the copyright would have been 
assigned by the author, and would form a part of the assets of, for example, a publisher. He 
nevertheless carves out that seizure will only be possible for the ways of publication for 
which the author has given consent. 
 
For these reasons, De Beaufort considered that Article 9(3) of the Act of 1881, forbidding the 
seizure of copyright altogether, went too far. Neither was there any indication, De Beaufort 
added, that it owed its existence to an early manifestation of the divulgation right. The 
Minister had simply declared that he shared the feeling of most of the Members, that a 
seizure of copyright was ‘undesirable’. In the Explanatory Memorandum of a later bill for the 
protection of works of visual arts, the Government had remarked that allowing the seizure of 
copyright would lead to ‘all kinds of difficulties’. However, De Beaufort sustained, those 
difficulties could hardly be insurmountable. De Beaufort nevertheless submits some pages 
later
9
 that the exploitation of an intellectual creation can not be placed on one level with 
other property rights. Showing sophisticated legal intuition as well as practical insight, he 
supposes that the execution of a copyright would create a considerable risk that it would end 
in the hands of a party with little respect for the personality rights of an author, whereas the 
author, in dire financial circumstances, would probably refrain from starting an expensive 
legal action with an uncertain result. Although De Beaufort himself found that these 
problems should be resolved by a special regime in the Code of civil procedure, it is by no 
means impossible that objections of this kind moved the Dutch legislator, in 1912, to partially 
maintain the general ban on seizure of copyright, as we will see. 
 
 
The Copyright Act of 1912 
 
The Copyright Act of 1912
10
 introduced a modified regulation of the immunity for seizure in 
Article 2(3). Its Article 25 recognized rights of integrity and paternity. Later additions in a 
special regulation for filmworks likewise contained provisions relevant for the protection of 
the moral rights. 
 
1912: immunity for seizure based on the moral right 
 
The immunity for seizure, which already figured in the law of 1881 (see above), was laid 
down in Article 2(3), though in a modified version: 
 
Article 2. 
[…] 
3. The copyright that rests with the maker of a work and, after his death, the copyright in 
any of his unpublished works transmitted to his heir or legatee, is not liable to seizure. 
 
The legislator, following the remarks made by De Beaufort, restricted the general eligibility 
for seizure to unpublished works. However, to the degree that the copyright still rested with 
the maker, the immunity for seizure was also upheld.  
 
                                                           
8
 With a reference to the regulation for works of visual art in Article 9 of the Belgian Copyright Act 
9
 De Beaufort 1909, p. 286-287 
10
 The legislative history has been published in : De Vries, Parlementaire geschiedenis van de Auteurswet 1912, 
‘s Gravenhage : SDU 1992 
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In reaction to a debate in the senate, the Minister clearly linked Article 2(3) to the moral 
right: “Quite rightly it was understood, that the ideal side of copyright forbids an unrestricted 
power of a creditor to seize this right.”
11
  
 
1912: rights of integrity and paternity 
It was not before 1912 however that the Dutch legislator introduced, in article 25 of the Act 
of 1912, the ‘classic’ moral rights such as the right of integrity and the paternity right. Even 
then, the wording of the moral rights article was to go a long way before it reached its 
present form. It was to be modified in 1931, 1972 and 1989. By 1989, Article 25 had become 
quite an extensive provision. In view of its central importance it is nevertheless quoted here 
in full. It reads in the present form:
12
 
 
Article 25  
1. Even after assignment of his copyright, the maker of a work has the following rights:  
a. the right to oppose the making public of the work without mention of his name or other 
indication as maker, unless such opposition would be unreasonable;  
b. the right to oppose the making public of the work under a name other than his own, as 
well as any alteration in the name of the work or the indication of the maker, in so far as 
these appear on or in the work or have been made public in connection with the work;  
c. the right to oppose any other alteration made to the work, unless the nature of the 
alteration is such that opposition would be unreasonable;  
d. the right to oppose any distortion, mutilation or other impairment of the work that could 
be prejudicial to the reputation or name of the maker or to his dignity as maker.  
2. After the death of the maker and until the copyright expires, the rights meant in the first 
paragraph rest with the person that the maker has designated by testamentary disposition.  
3. The right referred to in the first paragraph sub a, may be waived. The rights referred to 
sub b and c may be waived in so far as alterations to the work or its title are concerned.  
4. If the maker of the work has assigned his copyright, he remains entitled to make such 
alterations to the work as he may make in good faith in accordance with social custom. As 
long as copyright subsists, the same right shall belong to the person that the maker has 
designated by testamentary disposition, if it may reasonably be assumed that the maker 
would have approved such alterations.  
 
Article 25a  
For the purposes of this section, ‘relatives’ means the parents, spouse or registered partner 
and the children. The rights of the relatives may be exercised by each of them individually. 
In the event of a dispute the Court may render a decision, which shall be binding on them.  
 
We now turn to the historical development of these provisions, starting in 1912. 
 
 
The moral right in 1912: alterations in the work and the name; reasonableness 
 
The Copyright Act of 1912 introduced moral rights in Article 25,
13
 reading as follows: 
 
“Article 25. No alteration may be made in any work, mentioned in Article 10, 1° until 9°, 
with the exception of architectural works, without the permission of him, to whom belongs 
                                                           
11
 Memorandum of Reply of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Colonies, Eerste Kamer (Senat) 1911-
1912, nr 227, p. 592 
12
 taken from the English translation by Mireille van Eechoud in: Bernt Hugenholtz, Antoon Quaedvlieg, Dirk 
Visser, A Century of Dutch Copyright Law. Auteurswet 1912-2012., Amsterdam: deLex 2012, p. 505-546 
 
13
 Numbered, in the initial bill, as Article 23 
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the copyright in that work. If the maker has assigned his copyright, then during his life his 
permission is nevertheless also required. 
The same applies with regard to the name of the work and the indication of the maker, as 
far as these appear on or in the work. However, if a work has not been made public under 
the true name of the maker, then he, to whom accrues the copyright therein has, after the 
decease of the author, the right to mention the true name of the maker on or in the work, if 
this one has authorized him to do so. 
The provision in the first paragraph does not apply with regard to alterations of such a 
nature, that the maker or his successors in title could not in good faith refuse their 
permission. Also, the maker will keep, even if he has assigned his copyright, the right to 
make such modifications in the work as are permissible in good faith according to generally 
accepted standards.” 
 
 
The ratio of the moral right in the Explanatory Memorandum of 1912 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum
14
 is remarkably short as to the ratio of the moral right. It says: 
 
“In close connection to the copyright stays the right to protect the work against alterations, 
which the owner (of the work, ed.) or others, in order to increase the sale value or for 
whatever other reason, would like to make therein. Without the permission of him, to 
whom accrues the copyright, this ought not to be done, as indeed the scope, the value, of 
the copyright is determined by the shape, which the maker has assigned to the work. Here, 
the legislator touches upon a highly ideal side of copyright, to such a degree that the right 
to oppose alterations must stay with the maker even when he has assigned the copyright to 
someone else; for despite the assignment, the tight ideal bond between the maker and the 
work continues to exist, only to come to an end with life.” 
  
It is interesting that the Explanatory memorandum does not only recognize the ideal bond 
between the maker and the work as ground of the moral right, but also points at the fact, 
very concretely, that the shape assigned by the maker to the work determines the value of 
the work. It is as if the legislator connects the highly idealistic notion that it is the authentic 
expression of the author which determines the intrinsic value of the work, with an objective, 
down to earth statement that, given that the shape determines the value of the material 
object, the author keeps a right in it. It almost makes the impression that the legislator 
follows the reasoning, that the greater value of the author’s contribution being mixed with 
the lesser value of the material object would grant him a (moral) “property acquired by 
accession.” 
 
Works excluded from the moral right in 1912 
The first paragraph of Article 25 excludes two categories of works from the protection of the 
moral right: not only architectural works which are mentioned explicitly, but also, more 
implicitly, works of applied art. In fact, the Act mentioned these in Article 10, under 10°, 
whereas Article 25 was to apply only to the categories of  Article 10, 1° until 9°.  
 
The paternity right was not yet strongly articulated in 1912 
The Act of 1912 tried to catch the whole bundle of moral rights under a comprehensive right 
to oppose alterations of the work. In the wording of Article 25 version 1912, the Act protects 
against alterations in either the work itself, its name or in the indication of the maker. That 
formulation could give rise to doubt whether the general right of the author to have his or 
her name mentioned was meant to be included. As we will see hereunder, in 1931 the 
                                                           
14
 Tweede Kamer (Parliament) 1911-1912, nr. 227, nr.3, p. 12-13 (Article 23) 
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Minister would strongly sustain that this was the case;
15
 jurisprudence however developed in 
a sense which was not entirely unequivocal. Ultimately, the question became rather 
controversial in 1989 when the legislator finally wished to implement the full recognition of 
the paternity right, but economic stake holders argued this would be impracticable. 
  
The test of reasonableness and the right to repent in 1912 
Attention is further drawn to the final (third) paragraph of the article which contains a test of 
reasonableness: “The provision in the first paragraph does not apply with regard to 
alterations of such a nature, that the maker or his successors in title could not in good faith 
refuse their permission.” The provision is the result from a remarkable amendment 
introduced by Drucker.
16
 Drucker opposed the text of the (old) third paragraph as proposed 
in the bill, and which read:  
 
“The provision in the first paragraph does not apply with regard to alterations, which are the 
necessary consequence of changes in the destination or the use of the use of the work or of 
any good, of which the work is a part.” 
 
Drucker argued that this provision allowed modifications which under circumstances could 
violate the moral right of the author. Even more interesting, he added that on the other 
hand, the proposed paragraph was too restrictive, because even after the assignment of 
copyright, the author should in certain cases keep the right to review his work, for example in 
order to adapt a new edition of a book in view of progress made in learning and science. The 
amendment was approved. Consequently, the right to repent was introduced in 1912 as a 
kind of corrective corollary to the integrity right.  
 
Amendments in 1931. Architectural works. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Scope of the moral right in 1931: extended to architectural works 
Drucker´s amendment even played a further role when in 1931, the exception made for 
architectural works was removed, so that the integrity right henceforth was to extend to 
those works as well. The change proposed in the bill
17
 met with the resistance of some 
members of Parliament. The Minister replied that the modified wording of Article 6bis of the 
Berne Convention
18
 made it impossible to maintain the old wording of Article 25. He could 
add, however, that in view of the amendment of Drucker, a prohibition to alter an 
architectural work would not be possible with regard to changes of such a nature, that the 
maker (or his successors in title) could not in good faith refuse their permission. 
 
Explanatory Memorandum 1931: the Copyright Act already recognizes the paternity right 
The Explanatory Memorandum extensively argued that the Copyright Act in force already 
complied with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention which was a result from the Rome 
Conference of 1928, with the exception of a small modification to be applied to Article 25. 
The articles 25, 27 and 34 of the existing Copyright Act complied with the new Article 6bis. In 
particular, Article 25, par. 2, forbidding modifications in the name of the work or the 
indication of the maker, recognised the droit de revendiquer la paternité de l’oeuvre, for the 
author could demand that the public would find the correct name of the author mentioned 
when it made acquaintance with the work. Article 27 entitled the author to start an action 
                                                           
15
  
16
 Hendrik Lodewijk Drucker (1857-1917), in 1882 appointed as professor at the Faculty of Law in Groningen, 
and a member of parliament between 1894 and 1913. 
17
 TK 1930-1931, nr. 254 
18
 As a consequence of the Rome Act of the BC of 1928 
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for damages in case of infringement, even after the assignment of the copyright; the 
legislator linked this to the fact that the droit à la paternité stayed with author. Article 34 
contained sanctions of criminal law.  
 
In 1964, it turned out that the judiciary did not necessarily share this opinion. In the case 
Niermeyer v. Nijhoff,
19
 the District Court of the Hague held that, “in the absence of a 
mandatory legal provision” it was no infringement of the moral right to make no mention, in 
a scholarly publication, of the name of a contributor who had provided two important 
chapters for the book. E.D. Hirsch Ballin, who commented the decision, said this showed an 
urgent need for an addition to the law. It would nevertheless take almost 25 further years, 
that is, until 1989, before the Dutch Copyright Act finally adopted a full explicit recognition of 
the paternity right. 
 
As from 1931,
20
 the first paragraph of article 25 read: 
 
“No alteration may be made in any work, mentioned in Article 10, 1° until 9°, without the 
permission of him, to whom belongs the copyright in that work. 
 
Otherwise, the text of 1912 was maintained unchanged. 
 
 
The moral right in 1972. Waiver, assignees, heirs. 
 
The moral right revised in 1972 
In 1964 a bill was introduced to finally implement the Brussels revision of 1948,
21
 which of 
course was long overdue. It took no less than eight years of consideration and intensive 
debate
22
 before the law was finally passed on 27 October 1972.
23
 The legislator seized the 
opportunity to undertake a thorough revision of Article 25; the considerations in the 
legislative history are more elaborate than at earlier occasions.  
 
Terminology: hesitation to adopt the term ‘moral right’ 
For example, the issue of the terminology is raised. The Minister states that a literal 
translation of the ‘often used’ term of ‘droit moral’ in Dutch, ‘zedelijk recht’ – the term was 
actually used by MP Drucker in 1912 - could lead to the misunderstanding, that the right 
concerned no more than a moral obligation, as opposed to a binding provision. Therefore, a 
wording had been chosen in which a translation of the term ‘droit moral’ was superfluous. 
However, starting with H.L. de Beaufort in 1909, the majority of Dutch courts as well as 
authors generally use the term of ‘persoonlijkheidsrechten’ (personality rights, or more 
officially: copyright personality rights), although ‘morele rechten’ (moral rights) continues to 
be popular as an alternative choice.  
 
Amendments in the law of 1972 
The legislator proposed changes concerning: 
- the wording of the paternity right 
- the regulation of the integrity right 
                                                           
19
 District Court of The Hague 25 January 1965, Niermeyer v. Nijhoff (“Welvaart in wording”), NJ 1965, 76; Ars 
Aequi  XIV, 1964-1965, p. 186 note E.D. Hirsch Ballin 
20
 Act of 9 July 1931, Staatsblad 1931, 264 
21
 Nr. 7877 
22
 The reasons of the delay were not connected to the issue of the moral rights : see H. Cohen Jehoram, De 
Auteurswet gewijzigd, NJB 1973, p. 525-543 
23
 Law of 27 October 1972, Staatsblad 1972, 579. Entry into force on 7 January 1973, see Staatsblad 1972, 722. 
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- the deletion of assignees of the maker as holders of moral rights 
- the extension of the duration of the moral right from the date of the death of the author 
until the expiration of the exploitation right, 50 years post mortem auctoris 
- the extension of the moral rights to henceforth apply to works of applied art as well, 
following the Berne Convention  
 
Three of these changes will here be elaborated on somewhat more. 
 
The regulation of the integrity right. Limitation of the possibility of waiver of moral rights. 
As far as the integrity right is concerned, the bill introduced, apart from the right of the 
author to oppose – subject to the test of reasonableness – modifications of the work, an 
explicit right to oppose deformation, mutilation and other derogatory action (‘atteinte’)
24
 in 
relation to the work, which could cause prejudice to the name or honour of the author or his 
dignity as a maker. The specific characteristic of an atteinte/aantasting of the work lied in the 
fact that the work as such did not need to have been changed; for example, a work could 
have been published in an unbefitting context.  
 
It was further provided that – different from the right to oppose modifications - the right to 
oppose deformation, mutilation and other derogatory action could not be waived. As to this 
topic of waiver, the legislator made a careful weighing of interests. It was considered that a 
entire exclusion of every possibility of waiver would hamper legal transactions with regard to 
works eligible for copyright, so that in the end it would not be advantageous even for the 
authors themselves. On the other hand, creating a possibility of a comprehensive waiver of 
the moral rights would certainly lead to the use, in practice, of standard clauses which would 
make the whole regulation meaningless. The legislator then put forward that the bill meant 
to create a waiver of only certain parts of the integrity right, and more in particular of those 
parts “in which the interest of exploitation relatively weighed the most heavy and the honour 
and reputation of the author relatively had the least weight.” This were the (simple) 
modifications in the work and its name. Not every waiver would be valid: it would not be if it 
were contrary to the public order or public morals or would lack a valid legal basis. The 
Minister ended by strongly asserting that as far as deformations, mutilations and other 
derogatory ‘atteintes’ of the work were concerned, or modifications in the indication of the 
maker, under no circumstances a permission in advance could be granted.   
 
Assignees of the maker do not have moral rights. Modifications vs. the right of adaptation.   
As we saw, the 1912 version of  Article 25 seemed to designate the author as a holder of the 
moral right beside the copyright holder to which he had assigned the right. It provided:  
 
“No alteration may be made in any work, mentioned in Article 10, 1° until 9°, with the 
exception of architectural works, without the permission of him, to whom belongs the 
copyright in that work. If the maker has assigned his copyright, then during his life his 
permission is nevertheless also required (emphasis added).                                                                                                                                     
 
In 1972, the legislator considered this henceforth improper; he rightfully held that the 
successor in title of the exploitation right was not entitled to any role in the enforcement of 
the moral rights. It does not necessarily mean though that in 1912, the legislator made a 
naïve mistake against the nature of the personality right. It is not impossible that at that 
time, he made no distinction between the exploitation right in its form of the right of 
adaptation, and the moral right in its form of the right to oppose modifications. He started 
from the idea that actually, the author would keep his right to forbid adaptations; the only 
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aspect of ‘droit moral’ was that the author did not lose this part of his exploitation right when 
he assigned the rest of his (commercial) ‘copyright’, but would stay empowered to exercise 
it. That means that the legislator was willing to grant, in 1912, a right of integrity of an 
extremely generous scope (!), and illustrates at the same time how lucid and justified the 
intervention was by which Drucker at that time subjected the exercise of that right to a test 
of reasonableness. It is also clear, however, that by 1972, the legal evolution made it 
inevitable to make a neat distinction between the right of adaptation and the moral right to 
oppose modifications.  
 
The droit moral after death 
By far the most vivid reactions to the bill of 1972 would however be stirred by the proposal 
to extend the duration of the moral right, in compliance with the Berne Convention, until 50 
years after the death of the author, thereby creating what professor Dirk Visser would later 
call ‘mortal rights’.
25
 In the end, this led to the adoption of several amendments. As a 
consequence, Dutch law now restricts the exercise of moral rights to persons especially 
appointed by the last will. This Dutch ‘shoot the widow’
26
 mind set was to create 
embarrassing iniquities vis-à-vis surviving relatives. Jurisprudence managed in some cases to 
save foreign widows by manipulating international private law in ways which as such might 
have appeared questionable, but Dutch relatives continue to stay ignorant victims of the 
regulation of 1972.  
 
After these changes in 1972, Article 25 read as follows: 
 
“Article 25  
1. Even after assignment of his copyright, the maker of a work has the following rights:  
a. the right to oppose the making public of the work with mention of a name other than his 
own, as well as any alteration in the title of the work or the indication of the maker, in so 
far as these appear on or in the work or have been made public in connection with the 
work; 
b. the right to oppose any other alteration made to the work, unless the nature of the 
alteration is such that opposition would be unreasonable;  
c. the right to oppose any distortion, mutilation or other impairment of the work that could 
be prejudicial to the reputation or name of the maker or to his dignity as maker.  
After the death of the maker and until the copyright expires, the rights mentioned under a, 
b and c rest with the person that the maker has designated by testamentary disposition or 
by codicil.  
The rights under a and b may be waived in so far as alterations to the work or its title are 
concerned.  
If the maker of the work has assigned his copyright, he remains entitled to make such 
alterations to the work as he may make in good faith in accordance with social custom. As 
long as copyright subsists, the same right shall belong to the person that the maker has 
designated by testamentary disposition or by codicil, if it may reasonably be assumed that 
also the maker would have approved such alterations.”  
 
 
 
The moral right in 1985: applied to filmworks 
Statutory waiver of the ‘lower’ moral rights and express safeguard of the core of moral right 
                                                           
25
 DJG Visser, Mortal rights. Persoonlijkheidsrechten van degenen die hebben nagelaten na te laten, 
Informatierecht AMI 1993, p. 169-171 
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In 1985, an Act was passed in order to bring the Dutch Copyright Act in accordance with the 
Paris version of the Berne Convention of 24 July 1971.
27
 An important part of this operation 
consisted in introducing a new and – according to Dutch standards – elaborate regulation of 
film works. The new regulation covered several important aspects of the moral right. The 
central element in this new regulation is Article 45d: a (rebuttable) presumption of transfer 
of the copyright to the producer once the film is ready for showing. The regulation of the 
moral rights revolves around that presumption of transfer. On the one hand it strives at 
securing that the aim pursued by the presumption of transfer, an unhampered circulation of 
filmworks, is not frustrated by the exercise of moral rights; on the other hand, it wishes to 
offer a safeguard that the core of the moral right is maintained. In order to secure the aim 
pursued by the presumption of transfer the law contains a rebuttable statutory waiver of 
most of the moral rights which could, without important reasons, hinder the commercial 
exploitation of the film work. To prevent that the regulation would overshoot the mark, 
Article 45f provides that the maker is assumed to have waived (only) the right to oppose 
alterations to his contribution; consequently, the right to oppose mutilations and 
impairments stays with the makers. 
For a good understanding, one must know that according to Dutch law, the makers of a film 
work are taken to be [all] the natural persons who have made a contribution of a creative 
nature directed at the making of the film work.
28
 It is not so that only a more or less select 
company of more important contributors is considered as makers of the filmwork.   
The right of divulgation in film works (1985) 
Articles 45b and 45c and d seem to start from the assumption that according to Dutch law, 
authors can exercise a divulgation right in their creations before they consider it as 
completed – and thereby gives considerable support to this thesis. This property of the 
divulgation right is put aside by a statutory presumption. The producer has the right to use 
uncompleted contributions to the film work (45b), although it is held out in the Explanatory 
Memorandum
29
 that if this leads to a moral rights infringement as serious as a deformation 
or mutilation of the work, the maker can invoke the protection granted by Article 25, 
paragraph 1(c) – see, to that effect, Articles 45e and f. Furthermore, the producer alone 
decides when the film work itself can be considered as completed (45c). This is also a 
reduction of the right of divulgation, although it must be supposed that in a reasonable 
interpretation of the latter, only the most important contributors to the film, such as the 
director, would probably be able to successfully invoke that right. It is with regard to the 
director that the Explanatory Memorandum
30
 foresees that parties might agree otherwise in 
writing. This is allowed with regard to both provisions.  
Article 45b  
Where one of the makers is unwilling or unable to complete his contribution to the film 
work, he cannot prevent the producer from using the contribution as created for the 
                                                           
27
 Act of 30 may 1985, Staatsblad 1985, 307 
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 Article 45a, par. 2 
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 Explanatory Memorandum of 10 April 1981, TK (Parliament) 1980-1981, 16 740, p. 12 
30
 Explanatory Memorandum of 10 April 1981, TK (Parliament) 1980-1981, 16 740, p. 12 
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purposes of completing the film work, unless otherwise agreed in writing. With respect to 
the contribution he created, he is deemed to be its maker as meant in Article 45a. 
Article 45c  
The film work is deemed completed once it is ready for showing. Unless otherwise agreed in 
writing, the producer decides when the film work is ready for showing.  
Article 45d  
Unless the makers and the producer have agreed otherwise in writing, the makers are 
deemed to have assigned to the producer, as from the time meant in Article 45c, the right 
to make the work public, to reproduce it within the meaning of Article 14, to subtitle it and 
to dub the dialogue. [etc.] 
The rights of paternity and integrity in film works (1985) 
The exercise of moral rights after the completion of the film work, apart from  the right to 
oppose alterations, which is subject to a statutory waiver to the benefit of the producer, 
these largely remains unaffected. 
The paternity right even receives an extensive regulation in Article 45e. The Explanatory 
Memorandum
31
 considers the rights mentioned under a. and b. as customary and generally 
recognised, but, meaningfully, it adds: “whether Article 25 already encompasses these rights, 
is not certain.” This potential gap will not be stopped  until 4 years later in 1989. 
Article 45e  
With respect to the film work, in addition to the rights meant in Article 25, first paragraph, 
sub b, c and d, each maker has the right to:  
a. have his name mentioned on the film work in the usual manner, with mention of his 
capacity or the nature of his contribution to the film work;  
b. claim that the part of the film meant sub b is also shown;  
c. oppose the mentioning of his name on the film work, unless such opposition would be 
unreasonable. 
Article 45f  
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the maker is assumed to have waived the right to 
oppose alterations to his contribution as meant in Article 25, first paragraph, sub c, to the 
benefit of the producer. 
 
The moral right in 1989. Full implementation of the right to the paternity of the work. 
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Photopiracy provided the incentive to table again the issue of the paternity right in 1989, in 
the frame of a bill aiming at combatting copyright piracy.
32
 The assertions of the Minister in 
1931 proved not to impress the commercial counterparts of the photographers, who put 
forward, in essence, that the introduction of a paternity right would lead to unworkable 
complications in particular as far as the market for photographic works was concerned. Even 
Dutch ALAI uttered objections, but it also came up with a solution, in the form of the 
introduction of a reasonableness clause as already existed in Article 25. The Minister 
followed that advice and extended the reasonableness clause to the right of paternity. 
MP Kosto brought up the issue of the moral right post mortem, asking the Minister with 
some apparent amazement whether it was true that, in the absence of a testamentary 
disposition, the moral rights could not be exercised by the next of kin. The Minister answered 
that in this respect, the already existing legislation was to apply to the right of paternity; and 
that ‘in his view’, the requirement of a testamentary disposition had been introduced in 
order to avoid conflicts as to the person entitled to exercise the moral rights post mortem. 
Still, the question of the application of this rule to the right of paternity might perhaps have 
deserved some further consideration. In many cases, and especially in cases where the 
author has not entered into special agreements concerning the mentioning of the name 
during his life, the exercise of the right of paternity by his heirs might often be justified and 
mostly rather uncontroversial. Was the danger of conflicts as realistic in the case of the 
paternity right as it had been held in the case of the integrity right? 
The Act was passed on 3 July 1989
33
 and entered into force on the first of October of that 
year.
34
 The text of Article 25 took its present form, as cited here above in the beginning. 
 
b. The objectives and the underlying philosophy of the moral rights in the 
Netherlands 
 
Practical approach 
The Netherlands do not exactly have a tradition of grandiloquence concerning the moral right. 
Shortly before the introduction of the copyright law in 1912, the first Dutch author to deal with 
moral rights in some depth was H.L. de Beaufort. His observations are practice oriented and 
reasonable. He does not seek a deeper philosophical foundation of the moral right, but refrains 
himself to the  simple statement that when a work appears under the name of the author, he 
exposes his reputation and bears the responsibility for the work.  
 
The majority of authors agrees that the basis of the moral right is the bond between the maker 
and the work.
35
 Consequently, the right of integrity protects neither the work as such nor the 
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reputation of the author as such, independently of the work. This issue might seem academic, 
but as will be shown, it is not without importance for the dogmatic construction of the power of 
the courts to mitigate the application of the moral rights in the frame of a weighing of interests.   
 
 
 
2. What do the moral rights consist of in your country: 
 
- right of disclosure (divulgation) 
- right to claim authorship (paternity right) 
- right to respect and integrity 
- right to repent or to withdraw 
- the capricious ‘interest in exposure’ 
- the right of the painter to make similar paintings: a moral right? 
 
 
2.1 The right of divulgation under Dutch law  
The right of divulgation or of first publication is not mentioned as such in the law. Moreover, as 
was already remarked by De Beaufort in 1909, in most cases it ‘hides’ behind the more visible 
and concrete exploitation rights. That makes that it is often deemed hard to identify cases 
proving its existence. Some commentators doubt about that existence. Nevertheless, the 
Copyright Act contains some manifestations of the right of divulgation:  
 
2.1.1 Traces of the right of divulgation in the Copyright Act 
Immunity for seizure 
Article 2(3) Copyright Act excepts from seizure the copyright which belongs to the maker and, 
after his death, the copyright in works which have not been published and belong to persons 
who have acquired them as heir or legatee.
36
  
 
Prohibition to quote from a non published work 
Article 15a, para. 1 requires for a lawful quotation that the work has legally been published.  
 
Article 16, para 1 contains an exception allowing, under certain conditions, the use of parts of a 
literary, scientific or artistic work for the purpose of illustration for teaching. Like Article 15a, 
para. 1, it requires that the work from which the part is taken has been lawfully made public.  
 
Many or most authors relate the criterion that the work has legally been published to the moral 
right.
37
 It is however open to various interpretations. In a first interpretation, there only would be 
a legal publication when the work is made available in print to the general public. This would 
entail serious limitations for the freedom to quote and therefore for the freedom of expression. 
In a second interpretation, closer to the moral right spirit of the right of divulgation, the work 
would have to be considered as legally published as soon as it leaves, with the permission of the 
author, his intimate circle. This is far from requiring a publication aiming at the general public. 
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These questions will be dealt with under Question 8, regarding conflicts between the freedom of 
expression and moral rights.  
 
Prohibition to make a work ‘circulate’ before it has appeared in print 
A particularly interesting provision is Article 12, paragraph 1(2), which forbids to ‘circulate’
38
 
(even in a small circle) a work, as long as it has not appeared in print. This seems to be clearly 
linked to the protection of the ‘phase intime’ of the work and therefore to the divulgation right. 
Apart from that, it obviously is written with the book market in mind; not only with regard to 
music, film and other work categories, but even with regard to writings other than books meant 
to be published as such, the provision would need to be interpreted in accordance with the work 
category. It does not prevent that it forms a clear manifestation of the divulgation right. 
 
Right of privacy and right of divulgation 
A question more or less related to Article 12, paragraph 1(2), and which up to now largely 
remains unsolved under Dutch law, is in how far the interest protected by this provision – or by 
the right of divulgation - must be restricted to considerations concerning the aesthetic qualities 
of the work or whether it may also extend to its informational contents.  
 
Let us start with the case decided by the District Court of Arnhem on 8 August 1990. It concerned 
the diary of a daughter, whose two parents were engaged in divorce proceedings. In these 
proceedings, the father accuses his wife of misconduct in order to reduce his obligation to pay 
maintenance. The father lives alone in the marital home after this has been left by the mother 
and the daughter. In the attic of this home, the father finds an old diary of the daughter. It 
contains passages he apparently considers ideal to support his accusations of misconduct 
towards his wife. He quotes these passages in the procedure. He also sends quotations to his 
brother-in-law as well as to his parents-in-law.  
 
The daughter accuses the father of unlawful conduct – not of copyright infringement. This should 
not surprise: aspects of protection of privacy dominate the case, no (commercial) copyright 
interest is at stake, and some of the aspects of the conduct of the father are not actionable under 
copyright, whereas they are under the general doctrine of unlawful conduct. Indignantly, the 
President of the District Court judges that the conduct of the defendant is unlawful ‘in all 
aspects’, including the reading (!) of the diary without the permission of the daughter.  
 
However, the question remains whether the daughter could have invoked copyright protection. 
From a grammatical point of view, it can hardly be doubted that Article 12, paragraph 1(2) 
applies – unless one would read in that article, that it only applies to work destined to appear in 
print, which obviously was not the case for this diary. But should it apply as to its spirit? Some 
will upheld that the diary case in essence concerns nothing else than pure privacy interests, so 
that the application of copyright would not be well founded. Others might feel different. If the 
basis for the moral right must be found in the bond between the maker and the work, than it is 
obvious that this bond can result not only from the wording, but also from the subject and 
content. Moreover, to the extent that the author feels personally involved in subject and 
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content, it is almost impossible that this would not considerably influence aspects of the 
expression like the choice of words and style, the selection and arrangement of the factual 
elements, the personal judgment and interpretation of the author. Whether this will decide the 
case in favour of the (possible) application of copyright protection is however uncertain. 
 
Uncompleted works 
One of the practical applications of the divulgation right would be that an author has the right to 
prohibit the use of a work as long as he does not consider it as completed. Although Dutch law 
does not openly endorse this right, traces of such recognition can nevertheless be found. 
 
According to Article 45b, where one of the makers is unwilling or unable to complete his 
contribution to a film work, he cannot prevent the producer from using the contribution as 
created for the purposes of completing the film work, unless otherwise agreed in writing. This 
suggests that in absence of this special provision, the general rule would be that a producer 
would not be entitled to use a work as long as the author does not consider it as completed, or 
that at least, the danger might arise that the author would be entitled to do this in certain 
situations.  
 
2.1.2 Traces of the right of divulgation in Dutch case law 
 
Case law might contain more support for the exercise of a divulgation right than is commonly 
believed.  
 
The exploitation only starts at a moment the work has become outdated 
In a case which opposed illustrator Geesink and Terra Nostra,
39
 Terra Nostra published certain 
drawings made by Geesink only 19 years after they were made available to Terra Nostra. In the 
meantime, the style in which those drawings had been made had become old-fashioned. Terra 
Nostra was ordered by the Court to make mention of the fact that the drawings dated from 19 
years back. It is an indication that if the exploiter chooses a moment of first publication radically 
different from the one the author was entitled to expect, his moral right may be infringed. 
 
A previously unpublished fragment of the diary of Anne Frank 
Clear references to the right of divulgation were made by the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 
when it prohibited the pre-publication, by the press, of newly disclosed fragments of the diary of 
Anne Frank of 8 February 1943, containing observations about her mother.
40
 The exercise of the 
right of divulgation may in such cases come into conflict with interests protected by the human 
right of freedom of expression. 
 
 
2.1.3 Divulgation and  Distribution 
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Can the moral Right of Divulgation under circumstances thwart the exhaustion of the Distribution 
Right? This was the question in two intriguing cases in the Netherlands which both led to 
decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court..  
 
Calendar illustrations sold as paintings: a transformation right preventing exhaustion 
In 1979, the Dutch Supreme Court rendered an intriguing decision which in the past 35 years has 
not stopped to puzzle copyright lawyers. The Poortvliet case concerned the question whether the 
distribution on a different market was allowed of calendar illustrations which had been legally 
acquired. The artist Rien Poortvliet, highly popular in the Netherlands for his paintings of subjects 
like horses, dogs, wild animals, farmers and gnomes, had licensed the publisher Unieboek to use 
illustrations from his hand for calendars. A third party acquired the calendars, cut out the 
illustrations, put them on chipboard and sold them in this form. The calendars had been legally 
acquired; consequently the right of distribution was exhausted. Despite this, the Dutch Supreme 
Court prohibited the sale in the new form.
41
 Reactions on Poortvliet commented on the 
surprising fact that in this case, the contractual terms of the licence between Mr Poortvliet and 
his publisher Unieboek seemed to also have been considered binding for third parties.
42
 
However, Verkade convincingly argues that the decisive reason why exhaustion was denied in 
the Poortvliet v. Hovener case was the physical transformation of the copies, calling it the birth, 
in the Netherlands, of the ‘exhaustion-preventing-transformation right’.
43
  
 
Transformed copies and new markets 
It does not seem too far-fetched to assume that the relevant consequence of that physical 
transformation of the copies is that the ‘transforming’ party can open up a new market by 
offering those transformed copies.
44
 Perhaps therefore, the rule of Poortvliet could be explained 
as a rule that the exhaustion of the distribution right in a copy lawfully put on the market does 
not entail that the author also loses the right to serve, with a transformed product ‘extracted’ 
from that physical copy, a different market. In the same spirit, the Court of Appeal of Den Bosch 
read, in the ‘canvas transfer’ case to deal with hereunder, in the Poortvliet judgment that the 
“new form given to the copy [leads to] a new opportunity of exploitation for the one who 
markets that new form of the copy originally brought into circulation.”
45
 
 
Posters transferred on canvas 
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A more or less comparable situation arose in the case of the ‘canvas transfers’, a case in which, 
by the time this is written, questions have been put by the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) to 
the European Court of Justice.  
 
The company Art & All Posters started to separate, by a chemical process, poster illustrations 
from the paper they were fixed on and transfer them to a new support of canvas. This is done in 
the following way. Allposters takes a poster on paper. It applies to the poster a synthetic coating 
– the laminate – and subsequently transfers the illustration on the paper, by the use of a 
chemical process, to a canvas cloth. The canvas is fitted on a wooden frame. The analogy with 
the case of Poortvliet is obvious: there is a physical transformation of the copies, opening a gate 
to a new market segment. Of course, opinions can differ as to the question whether the 
transformation is either or not more radical than in the case of Poortvliet. 
 
The District Court of Roermond assumed these acts did not constitute a reproduction or 
adaptation.
46
 The Court of Appeal of Den Bosch
47
 found an infringement of the distribution right. 
Deciding the case in the light of the judgment in Poortvliet, it considered that the canvas 
transfers had a new form; and that this new form led to new opportunities of exploitation, as 
their price, considerably higher than the price for paper posters, and their new form targeted a 
new group of consumers.  
 
Following the Opinion of Advocate-General Verkade, the Hoge Raad decided to put questions to 
the European Court of Justice concerning the distribution right. Although the Hoge Raad 
mentions that Pictoright had invoked its moral rights, neither the Court of Appeal, nor the A-G or 
the Hoge Raad give attention to this question. For the following reasons, considering the moral 
right – and more in particular, the right of divulgation - might nevertheless have been fruitful. 
 
The commercial function of the moral right of divulgation  
The right of divulgation plays a somewhat hidden, but irrefutably material role in Dutch copyright 
law. In principle, it leaves to the author the right to decide how, when and in what form the work 
will be published. The characteristic of both the case of Poortvliet and the canvas transfer 
posters is that the work will be published in a new form. It therefore would seem difficult to 
determine, in a case like these, the scope of the exploitation right without having regard to the 
right of divulgation as well. It should be recalled that as we said before, the Dutch system is not 
strictly dualist, so that an interaction between moral rights and the defense of commercial 
interests cannot constitute an objection against such operation. All the more, as especially the 
right of divulgation is in most of its aspects so intensely intertwined with, or rather absorbed by, 
the exploitation right, that it is considered to ‘hide behind’ this.  
 
                                                           
46
 President of the District Court of Roermond 22 September 2010, AMI 2011, nr 3, p. 25-31, note Annemarie 
Beunen. 
47
 Court of Appeal of Den Bosch 3 January 2012, considerations quoted in the decision of the Dutch Supreme 
Court of 12 July 2013, ECLI :NL :HR :2013 :CA0265 ; NJ 2013, 400 ; IER 2013, nr. 61 p. 477 
 
 21 
That this moral rights aspect has remained unexplored is all the more surprising as A-G Verkade, 
explicitly and repeatedly,
48
 makes reference to the ‘moral right of the trade mark holder’ in 
Article 7 of the European Trademark Directive: the right of the trade mark holder to oppose 
further commercialization of the goods where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor, 
especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on 
the market. In that case, exhaustion shall not apply. It would not be so far-fetched to apply, in 
this copyright case, the copyright equivalent of that trade mark provision. 
 
2.1.4 Divulgation right and framed or embedded links 
 
The question rises whether the transmission of a work via a framed link or embedded link – or, 
for that matter, by means of a simple hyperlink – could, under circumstances, give rise to an 
action based on the violation of the right of divulgation.
49
 
 
 
2.2 The right to claim authorship (paternity right) 
 
As was seen above, full recognition of the paternity right in the Netherlands only became a 
reality in 1989. Although it was held by many that the Copyright Act in fact recognized the 
principle of the paternity right as from 1912, its text was not unambiguous, and some pretended 
that full recognition of the paternity right would meet with practical objections. In some cases 
however, it was certain that the paternity right in the copyright law did not apply: this happened 
with regard to works of US authors, at a time when the UCC did not yet apply. The fairly archaic 
national standard regime of Article 47 Copyright Act, still in force today as a monument of the 
past, reserved protection exclusively to works made by Dutch citizens or first published in the 
Netherlands. The courts found a simple solution and held that omitting the mentioning of the 
name should be considered as an unlawful conduct, as the following case shows. 
 
Integrity of the name of the author, the title and the contents of the work  
On 30 November 1961, the District Court of Rotterdam had to decide about the publication in 
the Netherlands, without permission of the right holders, of the American novel The Enemy 
General. The American work was not protected in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the District 
Court held that ‘apart from the existence of copyright as mentioned before, in principle every 
author is entitled to demand that if his work is published by someone else, this happens: a) with 
the mentioning of the name of the author; b) in an exact reproduction of the title and the 
contents, including in the event of publication in a foreign language.’  
 
The paternity right and the function or rank of the author 
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In one case, a District Court
50
 held that the paternity right was infringed by the fact that the 
academic rank of the author had not correctly been mentioned on the work. Perhaps it is useful 
to note that the wrong mention had been made by the university for which the author worked 
and was accompanied by other forms of unlawful behaviour towards the author.  
 
The moral right of paternity in employment relationships 
Part of Dutch jurisprudence and doctrine is of the opinion that Article 7 Dutch Copyright Act 
entails a statutory allocation of the moral right to the employer. It is put forward that employers 
can have an interest in the exercise of the moral right. Others deny that these of the employers 
are interests of the kind which copyright envisages to protect, and that as far as they are 
legitimate, the law offers other instruments to protect them which are better suited for their 
purpose.  
 
In recent jurisprudence, the resistance against granting the right of paternity to employers 
proves tough. A recent decision of the District Court of Amsterdam simply denies allocation with 
the employer by referring to the nature of the paternity right as a personality right.
51
 But a 
perhaps even stronger indication of the impetus of the paternity right is contained in a decision 
of the District Court of Utrecht,
52
 which, although it expressly recognized that the paternity right 
in a book about ‘Key Management Models’ was statutorily allocated to the employer, 
imperturbably granted the employees, who in the meantime had left the company, a right to 
have their name mentioned on the basis of ‘post contractual good faith’. Recently, the District 
Court of The Hague ruled again in the same spirit.
53
 
 
Economic functions of the right of paternity 
Dutch law is not opposed to the financial ‘exploitation’ of moral rights. They may be waived for 
financial remuneration. Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion might still be that the moral right 
primarily is based on and justified by moral considerations. The economic and pecuniary 
importance of the paternity right has only occasionally been pointed to. Jacqueline Seignette 
however explicitly dealt with it in her famous thesis:
54
  
 
‘Creators may have a considerable interest in having their names mentioned in connection with 
their works. Authorship credit may give an unknown creator recognition and the prospect of future 
work, while a famous creator may be able to capitalize on the value of his name when negotiating a 
fee for the use of his work.’  
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The awareness of this economic importance now gradually filters through in the jurisprudence. In 
a recent decision the District Court of The Hague recognizes the economic interest in the 
mentioning of the name of the author in view of making the name more widely known and 
acquiring new orders.
55
 The District Court of Leeuwarden stressed in 1991 the interest of the 
plaintiff to acquire renown.
56
  
 
An indication that the right of paternity, rather than (only) being a passive expression of the bond 
between the maker and his work, primarily serves a function – the function of making the name 
of the author better known and of enhancing his reputation – is provided by the fact that if, in a 
given case, this function becomes superfluous because the author is generally known to the 
relevant public, the exercise of the right of paternity may loose its justification. The Court of 
Appeal of Arnhem
57
 denied the authors of the design of banknotes the right to have their name 
mentioned in advertisements showing those banknotes or parts of them: ‘Indeed, by the daily 
and massive use which is made of banknotes, on which banknotes the name of the designer is 
mentioned, it is and it stays a fact of common knowledge that Oxenaar and Kruit are the 
authors.’  
 
 
 
2.3 right to respect and integrity 
 
 
2.3.1 The integrity right enforced via an action based on unlawful conduct 
 
Mutilation and deformation as unlawful acts 
The earliest manifestations of the protection of moral interest which I could find in the 
jurisprudence are based on general private law. As was already remarked above in relation to 
the paternity right, in some cases, the courts may have been compelled to turn to the 
general doctrine because copyright was not available. This happened with regard to works of 
US authors, at a time when the UCC did not yet apply. The fairly archaic national standard 
regime of Article 47 Copyright Act, still in force today as a monument of the past, reserved 
protection exclusively to works made by Dutch citizens or first published in the Netherlands. 
In 1958, the District Court of Amsterdam
58
 decided in a case about the reproduction, in the 
Netherlands, of an article which had appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of 26 September 
1953. As the plaintiffs had apparently foreseen that a claim based on copyright might be 
dismissed, they alternatively invoked the law on unlawful conduct. Although the court 
considered that it would be contrary to the law to provide, on the basis of the general law of 
unlawful conduct, a protection for specific copyright interests, it added that this did not 
exclude that ‘the way in which such a publication is reproduced can constitute an unlawful 
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act against the author or other interested parties. Thus, the author who cannot oppose the 
reproduction of his work, will have the possibility to oppose mutilation or deformation of the 
same.’ Interestingly therefore, the exercise of the moral right – or at any rate, the protection 
of an interest identical with the one protected by the moral right – was explicitly granted in 
spite of the strong reciprocity rule that the judge applied with regard to the exploitation 
right. 
 
Integrity of the name of the author, the title and the contents of the work  
On 30 November 1961, the District Court of Rotterdam had to decide about the publication 
in the Netherlands, without permission of the right holders, of the American novel The 
Enemy General.
59
 For the same reasons as in the previous case, the American work was not 
protected in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the District Court held that ‘apart from the 
existence of copyright as mentioned before, in principle every author is entitled to demand 
that if his work is published by someone else, this happens: a) with the mentioning of the 
name of the author; b) in an exact reproduction of the title and the contents, including in the 
event of publication in a foreign language.’ As the title had been changed and the text had 
been shortened, the publication was forbidden.  
 
Presentation of the work in a derogatory context 
However, even in cases where protection by the Copyright Act was fully available, cases were 
decided on the basis of general private law. Doctor Smol in Rotterdam, who had written a 
book under the title Man, woman, sexuality, was shocked when he found out that his 
publisher advertised for this scientific work on a leaflet together with other works, among 
which were ‘works of dubious character’; the Court of Appeal of The Hague forbade the 
further distribution of the leaflets as an unlawful act.
60
  
 
Supreme Court decisions based on general private law  
Like the lower courts, the Dutch Supreme Court reached decisions in cases concerning moral 
rights and their legal ‘periphery’ – some of which cases were groundbreaking – by relying on 
the general doctrine of tort and/or contract law. In the case of Patrimonium v. Heirs of 
Reijers,
61
 the Sculptor Reijers had contracted with Patrimonium to the effect that Reijers 
would make a sculpture named The hands, which was destined to be placed on the front of 
the 1st Lower Technical School in the Wibautstreet in Amsterdam. Later, Patrimonium 
pretended that for financial reasons, placing the sculpture there was not possible. It placed 
the sculpture on the front of another school it had not been made for and where it did not 
fit. The Court of Appeal considered that in view of its specific nature, the contract between 
Patrimonium and the sculptor obliged Patrimonium to place the sculpture on no other 
building than the 1st LTS, and to actually place it on the front of that building. The Supreme 
Court held that in finding so, the Court of Appeal had violated no legal rule and that the 
further interpretation of the contract belonged to the facts.  
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Interestingly therefore, a contract with an author is held to be of a ‘specific nature’ as a 
consequence of which the (moral) interest of the author that – and how – a work is realized 
or published, must be taken account of. This criterion of the ‘specific nature’ preluded the 
findings of the Supreme Court in the important cases of KRO v. Frenkel 
62
 and Körmeling v. 
Vlaardingen,
63
 which will be dealt with below as the ‘right to exposure’. 
  
Destruction of works as abuse of power under general private law 
The link between the moral rights and general private law was in a strange way confirmed in 
the 2004 decision in Jelles v. Zwolle. In that case the Hoge Raad rejected a moral right to 
oppose destruction, only to make it rise again under the (general private law) figure of tort. 
This private law phoenix showed qualities which are quite closely related to the ‘interest to 
exposure.’ It is as if at the fringes of the moral right, the courts are at once willing to 
recognize this interest but reluctant to assume the burden of an absolute moral right. 
Therefore, they prefer to deal with the said interest under general private law, which leaves 
the judge more free space to manoeuvre. This can be observed where matters are uncertain, 
as in the case of moral rights of employees or of the experimental moral right that the work 
be published, or where matters are hotly debated, as they werein the case of the possibility 
to oppose destruction of a work. 
 
 
2.3.2 Alteration, mutilation or impairment of the work 
 
Roughly spoken, there are four important categories of cases which the Dutch courts had to deal 
with in relation to the right of integrity: (a) alterations and mutilations of the material body of 
the work; (b) mutilation of a work by omitting it as a component of a work with which it has been 
combined; (c) impairments; (d) impairment of conceptual elements of the work.  
 
The defenses against allegations of infringement will be dealt with under Question 3: waiver of 
moral rights. This may have the drawback that it breaks the casuistic coherence of the individual 
cases. However, a casuistic presentation would consume a disproportionate volume of pages; the 
form of the Questionnaire aims at an analytical overview.  
 
(a) Alterations and mutilations of the physical body of the work 
Only a minority of cases concerns the impairment of the material body of the work. Problems 
arise where, especially in the field of architecture, practical needs demand the adaptation or 
modernization of a work. Courts may attach importance to the fact that the intended alterations 
are urged by huge exploitation costs; it is also important for the defendant to show that no 
acceptable alternatives are available.  
 
De Meerpaal 1988: priority given to urgent renovation 
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A typical example of these cases is provided by President of the District Court Zwolle 2 March 
1988.
64
 The situation in the ‘multifunctional community center’ De Meerpaal, which dated from 
1967 and combined a wide range of functions like cultural and sporting activities, had become 
unbearable. The staff was struggling with problems as cold, draught, noise and humidity; the 
exploitation deficit amounted to a staggering 1.5 million (Dutch guilders) a year; renovation was 
necessary for the preservation of the building. Although the President acknowledged that the 
intended alteration would deeply affect the architecture and the perception of the building, and 
took these arguments very seriously, he finally decided in favor of the renovation.  
 
Tietjerksteradeel 1988. No cheap solutions allowed for a commissioner of a representative 
building (who deliberately ignores warnings by an architect) 
It met with unanimous amazement – and criticism - when only a few months later, another 
municipality was defeated in court by the opposing architect, notwithstanding (seemingly) 
obvious functional deficiencies of the architectural design.
65
 The architect had equipped the 
brand new town hall of that municipality with majestic black glass walls which however  – in case 
of sunshine – made the temperature raise to degrees far above the level sustainable by the 
average civil servant. The (heated) authorities wished to bring these excessive temperatures back 
to normal levels by installing awnings, although these would destroy the majestic effect of the 
glass walls. Architect Bonnema however insisted on the installation of a system of air 
conditioning, even if the costs of a system of air conditioning were three times as high as those of 
the textile cloth solution the municipality preconized.  
 
The President held that in view of the representative character of the building, the municipality 
had to resign itself to the air conditioning desired by the architect. At first, this was criticized. The 
case came to be viewed in a wholly different light when - only later - an important aspect came 
out which was not mentioned in the decision.
66
 It turned out that the architect had, as from the 
beginning, included an airco system in his design. Despite his explicit warnings, the municipality 
had not realized this system for reasons of economy, one of the more consistently pursued 
virtues of the Dutch nation.  
 
Police office Maastricht: alteration of the color of panels between the window  
The police office of Maastricht was altered by an architect different from mr. Snelder, the one 
who had designed the building. Mr Snelder did not object against the alteration of the building. 
However, he opposed against the fact that apart from this, the initial colors of the exterior of the 
building had been altered, more in particular, by replacing the blue/green colors of the panels 
between the window sections and the green color of the sunblinds by lighter colors. The Court of 
Appeal of Den Bosch considered that the colors initially intended by the architect took an 
eminent place in the architectonic concept. There was no indication that functional requirements 
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regarding the alteration constrained to giving the panels another color. The Court of Appeal 
found an infringement of the integrity right.
67
  
 
 
Enforcement despite important consequences 
Fortior had held out in a contract with the architect’s office of Loxodrome, that the realization of 
a new architectural project would take place in 5 phases in that after each of these phases, 
Fortior could end the contract and seek a new architect. Furthermore, the parties had stipulated 
that “after the realization of the work”, the architect would not oppose further alterations.  
 
The District Court of Maastricht
68
 inferred from this that that the waiver by the architect of the 
right to oppose alterations only took effect as from the realization of the building. Fortior, who 
apparently wished to make certain modifications even before the start of the new phase – 
possibly anticipating a new approach in that phase – was not allowed to do this before the work 
of the 3
rd
 phase by Fortior had been realized. It is an exercise of the integrity right with some 
flavor of the right of divulgation. The Court accepts that its decision has severe consequences. 
Not only for the commissioner of the building, who is forbidden to make alterations at the 
present moment, although it is certain that these will be allowed after the realization of the 
building. However, then it will - obviously – only be possible to make alterations at a much higher 
cost. The consequences of the enforcement of the moral right extend further to third parties, as 
it is stated in the decision that the pupils of the school will have to stay longer in their present 
location. This does not prevent, according to the court, that those interests must be 
subordinated to the interests of the author which weigh heavier. 
 
Breitman v. van Manderen: far reaching consequences of the exercise of the integrity right 
The consequences of a decision of the Judge for Provisional Measures in Amsterdam in 2011
69
 
might have reached even further. The plaintiff was the architect of the Riva-project, including 
residential and commercial premises, social-cultural space and parking places, which at the time 
of the litigation had already been realized. But the project also included a mosque, which the 
defendant, a property developer, due to financing difficulties planned to realize at half the costs 
estimated by the architect. On the basis of the right of integrity, defendant was forbidden to 
execute these plans, despite the considerable consequences, either financial or social. 
 
 
(b) mutilation of a work by omitting it as a component of a work with which it has been 
combined 
Where two works are combined into one, the alteration or mutilation of one of those works can 
lead to the mutilation of the whole work and its two components. Struycken and Unger had 
collaborated to create a design for a Dutch stamp: Struycken designed the illustration, a portrait 
of the Queen, and Unger the indication of the value. The design of the stamp was subsequently 
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brought on the market as a postcard, but the indication of the value of the stamp was replaced 
by another typeface, which was fatter and coarser. The publication of the postcard was held to 
infringe the moral right, not only of the designer of the illustration of the stamp, but also of the 
designer of the indication of the value, which had been replaced.
70
 
 
 (c) Impairment of the work 
Most jurisprudence concerns cases in which the physical body of the work as such is left intact, 
but in which it is considered to be impaired by environment in which it is placed, its presentation 
and its context. In general, such actions are comprised under the category of what Dutch law 
calls impairment (‘aantasting’) of the work or what the Berne Convention would qualify as 
‘(other) derogatory actions in relation to the work’. Of course, in such situations there is much 
more room for discussion whether the act of the defendant is unlawful or not. 
 
Staal v. Beurspassage 1992: mutilation or impairment? 
In some cases, the dividing line between a mutilation and an impairment may be unclear. 
Architect Staal had designed the front of three adjoining buildings, known (together) as the 
Metropool building. The owner wanted to destroy the southern part of it, known as the building 
of IJzer, as the 25-year-old office building did not comply anymore with the modern standards. 
The President of the District Court Amsterdam dismissed the argument that the buildings had to 
be considered as one complex (or one may read: one work),
71
 but 9 months later, the Court of 
Appeal held that the Metropool building had to be considered as one architectural creation.
72
 
 
Beurspassage had put forward that the demolition of the building of IJzer was required on 
functional grounds; Staal disputed this. The Court of Appeal considered that in summary 
proceedings, these technical questions could not be decided. It found that it had insufficiently 
been shown that it was impossible to maintain the fronts and found, provisionally, in favor of the 
architect/plaintiff. However, the Court of Appeal added that if after all the contrary would be 
established and the destruction would prove to be inevitable for reasons of functionality, it 
would be unreasonable if the architect opposed the destruction. This finding was criticized by H. 
Cohen Jehoram in his note, who argued that whereas an author cannot oppose a modification 
when this is unreasonable, this clause does not apply in the more serious case of a mutilation. 
This is true, but as will be explained later, courts tend to reintroduce the test of reasonability in 
such cases via the question whether the mutilation is of such a kind as to be prejudicial for the 
reputation of the maker. If the mutilation is justified on sufficiently convincing  functional 
grounds, that might not be the case.  
 
The case finally ended with a settlement in which the architect allowed the demolition. This kind 
of settlements has sometimes given the moral right a bad reputation. It was felt that the integrity 
right for architects tended to turn into a (rather generous) regular ‘bonus’ for makers whose 
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creations had become obsolete, even though it was foreseeable that their works often have a 
limited life cycle, and even though architects use to be paid well for their creative input when 
compared to other categories of authors.   
 
Abridged version of a book 
In another case, Issidorides, author of the book The Landscape of Love, an Atlas, opposed with 
success the publication of an abridged version of the work by the publisher whom she had 
licensed to publish the work in the Netherlands.
73
 Plaintiff characterized the abridged version as 
a ‘vulgarized’ one. Interestingly, the court considered that the author could oppose the use of 
the work in another context than she had given permission for. 
 
Changes in the placing of the work 
Normally, the changing of the placing of a work of art as such will – of course – not constitute an 
infringement of the moral right,
74
 but in combination with other circumstances, such as 
contractual agreements about the placing,
75
 or wrongly representing the actual placing in a 
design,
76
 it can lead to an infringement of the moral right. An infringement of the integrity right 
was also accepted when the cultural centre De Meerpaal placed a large painting of 6x15 metres 
at a height of 2.20 metres, which was higher than initially intended, in order to allow an easy 
passage underneath it.
77
 
 
Changes in the surroundings or context of the work 
An impairment may further result from the fact that the work is realized without elements which 
were intended to be added to its presentation. In the Sun Fighter case, the municipality of 
Haarlem and the sculptor Arthur Spronken had contractually agreed that the municipality would 
place the sculpture ‘Sun Fighter’ on the Great Market of Haarlem, in combination with a 
functioning fountain.
78
 In the end however the municipality chose another place, where the 
sculpture was installed without the promised mountain. In court, the municipality declared that 
the artistic views within ‘certain circles of the municipal authority’ had changed and that 
moreover, the funds reserved for the initial execution were not available anymore. The Court of 
appeal considered that in view of article 25, a reliance on changed artistic views on the side of 
the municipality would have had to meet very high standards and that moreover, Spronken had 
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alleged that he had realized the sculpture in view of its placement on the Great Market. The 
municipality was ordered to place the sculpture at that place in a functioning fountain basin. 
 
Ceiling paintings in a theatre, corresponding with the colour of the carpets 
More controversial was the following case. The artist Irene Verbeek had realized (abstract, 
colorful) ceiling paintings in the municipal theater of the city of Groningen. She intended to form 
an artistic unity with the festive red carpets decorating the interior of the theater. In 2004 the 
municipal theater replaced those red carpets in several rooms by new  ones in three shades of 
blue, while maintaining them in the theatre hall. Irene Verbeek objected to this, considering it an 
impairment of her ceiling paintings, which meant to form an artistic unity with a surrounding in 
unitary red carpets. The District Court of Groningen
79
 found that the work of art owed its 
significance to a great extent to its surroundings, at it had especially been made for those 
surroundings and formed an artistic unity with them. When making the concept of the work, the 
artist had made herself lead by the surroundings and their color, of which defendant – the 
municipality – was aware. It could not be doubted that the colors of the surroundings had been 
of great importance, as the work owed its importance for an important part to the colors 
applied. The court ordered the city to remove the new blue carpets which had been laid to 
replace the previous red ones. Again, it is obvious that in certain cases, courts do not hesitate to 
enforce moral rights despite onerous and far-reaching consequences. In this case, the new blue 
carpets had already (almost) wholly been laid at the time of the decision.  
 
In a note, Judica Krikke roasted the judgment under caustic criticism. However, it seems a given 
thing that Dutch courts take moral rights especially serious in case of works commissioned for 
‘representative’ purposes, and even more when this is done by institutions called to have a 
special duty of respect towards the cultural heritage such as museums, theatres and 
universities.
80
 In the case of a municipal theatre as symbol of an artistic environment, compliance 
with moral rights might therefore be of a greater weight than in the case of a private or 
commercial party.  
 
Impairment by changing the purport of a work. Consequences for parodies?  
Photographer Koen Wessing took a picture of two women in Nicaragua, crying after their father 
had been killed by troops of dictator Somoza. The newspaper the Telegraph published that 
photograph with the text, that “the civilian population [was] the victim of the fight between the 
Sandinists and their adversaries.” Wessing objected: the intention of the photograph was to 
accuse the dictator, whereas now, the accompanying text put the emphasis on the part of the 
Sandinistic liberation movement. In 1986, the Court of appeal of Amsterdam
81
 confirmed a 
decision from the District Court
82
 that Article 25 of the Copyright Act had been infringed. 
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In the light of that ruling, there might be some doubt whether a later decision of the Court of 
Appeal of Amsterdam can be upheld under all circumstances, that if a defense that a work is a 
parody is honoured, there can be no infringement of the moral right of the parodied work.
83
 In 
yet another case, the Court of Appeal held that in the absence of an infringing adaptation or 
transformation, there could not be an infringement of the moral right.
84
 Although as a general 
rule, these statements might be approved, they might in certain cases appear to be too absolute. 
One could imagine a parody that does not reproduce too many elements from the original but 
that, without explicitly saying so, suggests that the parodied work also expresses or symbolizes 
(racist, sexist, fascist
85
) opinions or feelings which in fact it does not. It should not be excluded 
that this might constitute a sound ground for the author to object against the parody on the 
basis of his moral right.  
 
Impairment by presenting a different work under the same title 
It happens in the theatre world
86
 that theatre directors present on stage representations of a 
play which has been modified to the point that little more than the title corresponds anymore to 
the original piece; still the representation is announced under that title and the public is induced 
to believe that what it sees has a certain connection to the original play. Supposing that in fact, 
the representation deviates so far from the original piece that it has become a new and 
independent work, the success of an action based on deformation or mutilation of the work 
would not be certain anymore. Nonetheless, prejudice the honour and reputation of the author 
of the play might very well still result from such actions. Wild ‘interpretations’ presented under 
the name of the original work cause confusion and can hardly fail to affect the reputation of the 
author. In such cases, it could be considered whether the original work is not ‘impaired’ by the 
strong association created by the use of the same title for a very different production. 
 
(d) Impairment of conceptual elements of the work 
Two cases are of interest because they concern (or at least, come close to) the question whether 
or not the presence of certain elements in the environment can interfere with conceptual 
elements of a work of art.  
 
Spacial compositions 
The first one opposed the artist Devens and the city of Eijsden. In 1984, the artist Devens creates 
a work consisting of ‘eight spacial constructions’ which is placed in front of the monumental 
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town hall of Eijsden.
87
 The spacial constructions are composed of concrete blocks in the form of a 
cube and transparent screens of perforated metal sheets. Around 1992, the municipality of 
Eijsden wishes to (also) place a fountain in front of the town hall. Devens however considers his 
work as a spacial composition in which space cannot be ignored. If the space were broken by 
another object, the composition, and therefore the work, would be modified and mutilated.  
The Court of Appeal
88
 started out stating that the municipality could not object that as there was 
no alteration ‘in’ the body of the work, there could be no alteration in the sense of Article 25, 
paragraph 1(c). It endorsed expert opinions which had submitted that the artistic work comes to 
life when one moves in the direction of the town hall, whereby the monumental entry is a fixed 
point of orientation and a varying view is offered on the building by the perforated metal sheets 
which alternatingly allow an unhampered view on the entry or veil it. Finally, the placing of the 
fountain was considered contrary to Article 25, paragraph 1(d). 
 
The integrity of an imaginary connection with an empty space  
Perhaps inspired by the success of her colleague Devens, the sculptor Christine Chiffrun tried to 
go one step further. In 1991, a sculpture by Chiffrun representing A. Winkler Prins, the author of 
the first Dutch encyclopaedia, was placed in front of the Winkler Prins building in Veendam. The 
triangular pedestal of the sculpture pointed as an arrow in the direction of the (empty) place 1 
kilometre further where, before, had stood the presbytery where Winkler Prins wrote the 
encyclopaedia. In 1992, the Rotary Club of Veendam, on the occasion of its 60th anniversary, set 
out to offer the town as a gift ‘of lasting value’ an object commemorating Winkler Prins at that 
very empty place. Chiffrun objected and sustained that the virgin place where the former 
presbytery had stood formed a conceptual but essential part of her work, which was impaired by 
the placing of the object offered by the Rotary Club. The President rejects the claim based on 
infringement of the moral right because he is of the opinion that the conceptual element of the 
work basically consists of an idea or concept, which makes that it is not eligible for copyright at 
all. If discussion seems possible about this conclusion as such, it becomes perhaps more 
convincing in the light of what is stated further, in the frame of an action based on unlawful 
conduct, where the President basically states that Rotary (or other third parties) neither could 
nor ought to have been aware of the fact that the placing of the object would impair the work of 
Chiffrun.
89
  
 
 
2.4 right to repent or to withdraw 
 
Article 25, para 4 provides: 
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4. If the maker of the work has assigned his copyright, he remains entitled to make such alterations 
to the work as he may make in good faith in accordance with social custom. As long as copyright 
subsists, the same right shall belong to the person that the maker has designated by testamentary 
disposition, if it may reasonably be assumed that the maker would have approved such alterations. 
 
It has been contended that especially young authors – and performing artists – should be 
protected in their ‘right to make mistakes’ – the right to withdraw works which cause shame to 
the later, ripe artist – even though the risk exists that the passages which the artist regretted in 
his own later years will, a century later, come to be admired as the flash of a genius far ahead of 
his time.
90
 This was the case with an adolescent master piece of the author Lodewijk van Deyssel. 
 
 
2.5 the capricious ‘interest in exposure’ 
 
The right to exposure as a defense against destruction or removal 
We return now to the economic interests underlying the paternity right and identified by the 
2011 judgment of the District Court of The Hague mentioned here above in 2.2: making the name 
of the author more widely known and acquiring new orders.
91
  
 
The same interests are also mentioned in the seemingly totally different context of the integrity 
right, more particularly where authors oppose the destruction or the removal of a work. Could 
this indicate that there is a connection between these interests?  
 
De Haas v. Ulrich: exposure as a means to acquire orders 
In 1978, the District Court of Amsterdam
92
 found that a wall painting of Toon de Haas had been 
mutilated by the fact that the owner of the building had made it invisible by covering it with 
white paint. In 1969, the owner had commissioned the wall painting in order to decorate the 
entrance hall of his office building in Amstelveen. As to the harm caused, the District Court 
considered that as it had not been shown that the hall of the office was much frequented by the 
public, this harm was limited; in essence, the District Court held, a work had been obscured 
which could serve the author as a reference for acquiring new orders. What emerges here is 
what might be called a ‘right to exposure’. It primarily has the function of allowing the author to 
make the public aware of his work and his name in order to acquire new orders; this coincides 
with the economic function of the right of paternity which was identified above. 
  
Non exposure as a cause of damage to the renown and the appeal of an artist 
De Haas v. Ulrich is not an isolated case. In a judgment of 29 December 1993,
93
 the Court of 
Appeal of Leeuwarden, forbade the University of Groningen to destroy a mural on a separation 
wall between two buildings of the University, which it wished to remove in order to create a 
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more efficient layout of the premises. Among other arguments, the Court of Appeal considered 
that the fact that the public would no longer be able to view the work could damage ‘the appeal 
and the renown of Van den Berg.’ There are still more cases in which the interest of the author to 
have his work exposed is, implicitly, recognized. In many of these cases however, other interests 
prevail which ultimately overcome the interests of the maker. The President of the District Court 
of The Hague gave this element a rather material twist in a case where he considered that 
maintaining in a mutilated state a giant sculpture placed in an industrial zone would not prevent 
the artist from acquiring new orders, as he had never come to visit the work with potential 
commissioning parties.
94
   
 
‘Dreams are alive’: the interest of the author to have his work reach the public  
The heyday of the past century regarding the legal development of moral rights may have been  
the case of the TV documentary ‘Dreams are alive’.
95
 
The Dutch broadcasting organization KRO had ordered Frenkel to make a documentary film 
about the dreamers of the Senoi. It concerned a people in Malaysia, to which an important 
dream cult was attributed. In the standard contract with the filmmaker, the KRO reserved the 
right not to broadcast the film. Mr Frenkel completed the film and delivered it to the KRO. At 
that time, the head of the department of Informative Programmes gave him the prospect that 
the film would be broadcasted. However, after a new head of department replaced the first one, 
the KRO changed its position. The film would not be broadcasted as it was considered confusing, 
because it was not in line with the scheme of the script and because ‘broadcast time is scarce 
and one is forced to choose the best.’ 
 
Upon this, Frenkel demanded that the film be broadcasted before 1 January 1984.  
 
The Dutch Hoge Raad finds that it must be assumed that the commissioning order to make a 
documentary film fit to be broadcast has, as to its nature, the goal that the film will, even if the 
broadcasting organization has not committed itself to broadcasting the film, actually be 
broadcasted after acceptance by the broadcasting organization. As a consequence, the freedom 
the broadcasting organization has reserved to decide whether the broadcasting will take place, 
does not stretch so far that it can, in taking that decision, ignore the justified interests and the 
moral rights of the author. The matter was referred to the Court of Appeal of The Hague to 
decide on this issue; the judges of the Court of Appeal eventually found in favour of Frenkel.
96
 On 
28 September 1986 the documentary on the dreamers of the Senoi was finally broadcasted.
97
  
 
The decision of the Hoge Raad, and more in particular its reference to the moral rights of the 
author was immediately recognized as important. Herman Cohen Jehoram characterized it as 
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internationally causing quite a stir,
98
 adding that it was striking that the Hoge Raad had engaged 
into solving a matter it could easily have qualified as belonging to the facts. Above all, the 
judgment triggered a fierce discussion as to whether it entailed the recognition of a general 
moral right, as a consequence of which the categories of moral rights defined by the Copyright 
Act did not have to be understood anymore as a closed catalogue;
99
 it was also debated whether 
the reference to the moral rights should be understood as to imply that the decision not to 
broadcast the documentary after the KRO had already committed itself to such broadcasting, 
constituted a ‘derogatory act’ in relation to the work which was prejudicial to the honour and 
reputation of its maker.  
 
A quarter of a century later, it is felt that perhaps other aspects are as important. It is not really 
essential whether the broadcasting of the film is qualified as a right or an interest of the maker, 
or something in between; the ‘right of the author to exposure’ may present itself in the official 
robe of the moral right where it concerns the paternity right. It may take the appearance of the 
integrity right when a work is made invisible. And it may unexpectedly surface as the guerilla war 
force of a ‘justified interest’ where a broadcasting organization plays too arbitrarily with the right 
it has stipulated to broadcast or not a documentary.  
 
How important the publication of the ordered work can be was eloquently expressed by Verkade 
in his note in AMI 1985, 113: the publication is often more important than the recompense; the 
refusal to broadcast can have a disastrous effect on the maker’s reputation in professional circles 
and on his professional career. 
 
The Supreme Court in Körmeling v. Vlaardingen: (only) an ‘obvious interest’ in realizing the work 
A decade later, in a case also concerning the realization of a work of art, the Hoge Raad only 
spoke of ‘an obvious interest’ of the maker. There was no mention anymore of his moral rights. 
This destroyed some of the charms of KRO v. Frenkel.
100
 However, the term ‘obvious’ interest
101
 
still is a particularly strong one. That interest was defeated, in this second case, by even stronger 
interests of third parties; but that could also have happened with a ‘real’ moral right. It is telling 
that in 2004, the Dutch Supreme Court considered that the destruction of a work could under 
circumstances imply abuse of power by the owner. It needs a strong interest for the doctrine of 
abuse of power to be re-adjusted by the interests of the author. The ‘interests of the author’ in 
Jelles v. Zwolle are in essence no different from the ‘obvious interests’ in Körmeling v. 
Vlaardingen and the ‘moral rights’ in KRO v. Frenkel.  
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An echo of KRO v. Frenkel can sometimes be found in later case law, as in District Court of 
Arnhem 23 July 2004.
102
 The plaintiff was a biologist. She worked as a free lancer and visiting 
lecturer for the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands. She had made contributions for 
the CD ROM “The Biology of Lower Plants” for academic education. According to the Dutch 
copyright system, free lancers keep their copyright; it only is different in case there is an 
employment contract. When the University planned to also issue a commercial version, she 
wanted a remuneration for the exploitation. Subsequently, the University deleted the 
photographs  and drawings of plants from her hand from the CD ROM. The District Court found 
in 2004 in favour of the plaintiff, considering that the university had acted contrary to the 
expectations raised with the plaintiff that het photos and drawings would be maintained. The 
District Court added that the defendants generated income by the exploitation of the CD-rom of 
which a reasonable part could have been awarded to the copyright holders. By omitting this and 
instead deleting the photos and drawings of plaintiff she had failed in fulfilling het obligations 
towards the plaintiff. 
 
Balancing interests and boundaries to the right of exposure 
In the already mentioned case of 20 May 1994, Körmeling v. Vlaardingen, a conflict arose 
between the artist Körmeling and the municipality of Vlaardingen. Vlaardingen had 
commissioned a ‘spatial object’ from the artist. Körmeling designed, as part of the project, a 
neon text intended to decorate an old people’s home, consisting of the text ‘De negende van 
OMA’. Körmeling pretended that the text was meant to do homage to the Office of Metropolitan 
Architecture, but in common Dutch the word ‘OMA’ means granny, and the inhabitants of the 
old people’s home did not take it well. As emotions exploded and public commotion increased, 
the municipality, that initially had supported Körmeling, finally gave in to the protests. The Hoge 
Raad indicated that in interpreting the agreement in the light of the requirements of 
reasonableness and fairness, Article 3:12 of the Civil Code obliged to take into account the 
interests of third parties, and that consequently, the municipality – that had paid Körmeling the 
full sum due for his work – could not be compelled to cooperate in order to place the litigious 
text on the building. The Hoge Raad added that Körmeling had an obvious interest in having the 
neon text placed; however the Court of Appeal had found that the interests of the inhabitants 
weighed so much more, that the requirements of reasonableness and fairness did not allow that 
his interest be granted priority.  
 
Already in 1989, the District Court of Arnhem had held that despite the interest of the author, 
sustained by the law of obligations and the Copyright Act, that a work designed for a certain 
environment be placed there, a crematorium could remove a tapestry that was perceived by the 
mourners as ‘too dominant and cheerful’.
103
  
 
It cannot amaze that the same fate struck the painting Mais où est la merde of Mirko Krabbé 
which – although the title ‘Mais où est la merde’ suggests that the work of art addressed a 
different public than children – covered a whole wall in the Emma Children’s Hospital, a part of 
the Amsterdam Medical Center AMC. The President of the District Court stated that the painting 
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had an effect which caused a great disturbing impact on the staff, the young patients and their 
parents, and which was not desirable on a children’s ward.
104
 Articles in the press revealed that 
the painting inspired fear in the sick children. Krabbé did not give up, but his appeal was 
dismissed.
105
 
 
A temporal element in the balance of interests 
The fact that the right to exposure is subject to a test of reasonableness makes that the factor of 
the period during which a work has already been exposed may play a role. The District Court of 
Arnhem
106
 considered in 1992 that if on the one hand, the work to be destroyed was of a modest 
level of originality, on the other hand it was of a very recent date so that the honour and 
reputation of the author were still freshly and therefore sensitively attached to it. Frequently, the 
formula is used that the maker cannot claim the permanent exposure of the work.
107
 The fact 
that a work of art had already been exposed for a long time was taken into account by the 
President of the District Court of The Hague
108
 and by the Court of Appeal of Leeuwarden.
109
 
Above, it was already indicated that wear & tear, natural decay and high costs might cause a 
claim to restore the work to fail; the same applies of course to the right of exposure, which in 
fact in a way coincides with such claims. 
 
Conclusion 
Do we witness the emergence of a (limited) right to exposure? It could be, but it is also clear that 
it will never be able to take the monolithic force of its fellow moral rights. Too much depends on 
contractual provisions and other circumstances. It is nevertheless obvious that the ‘interest to be 
exposed’ in its two faculties: related to both the name and the work, can be of great support in 
order to reach fair conditions for authors. 
 
 
2.6 The right to make similar paintings 
 
Directly preceding the main provision on moral rights in Article 25 of the Dutch Copyright Act 
figures an almost forgotten Article 24 stating that the maker of a painting remains entitled to 
make similar paintings: 
 
Article 24  
Unless otherwise agreed, notwithstanding the assignment of copyright in a painting, its maker 
remains entitled to make similar paintings.  
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Article 24 is not considered to provide a moral right; at least it is never mentioned as such. It 
nevertheless shares the typical characteristics of moral rights. It stays with the author even after 
the assignment of the copyright. It cannot be assigned itself, as it is bound to the maker. It 
expires with his life, even before other moral rights in Dutch law. That it can be waived by an 
express agreement, does not disqualify it as a moral right: the same applies to several moral 
rights mentioned in Article 25, such as the right to oppose alterations of the work. Finally, the 
legislative history reveals that Article 24 aimed in the first place at the defense of the intellectual 
freedom of the maker: visual artists should have the freedom to re-use elements of previous 
work which continue to fascinate them.  
 
In the present era, it could be more useful than in the past to secure such a freedom for artists. 
Generosity towards artists is no given thing anymore. There might even be reasons to consider 
whether it should up to some extent be broadened in scope as to cover not only other categories 
of works, but also – up to some extent – variations of an artist’s own work of which 
reproductions would be offered to the market (as opposed to similar works in individual unique 
copies). A case could be imagined of an artist with a strongly individual style who makes a work 
for commissioner (A); subsequently, and in good faith, he accepts a similar commission from B. 
Both parties exploit the result on the market. A accuses B of infringement. The question arises 
then whether an artist must have the right to plagiarize elements of his own work without having 
to live under constant fear that this might create liabilities. This could actually hinder creative 
freedom.    
 
 
 
3. Can the moral rights be transferred or waived in your 
country? 
 
Moral rights are considered unassignable. 
 
According to Article 25, para. 3 of the Copyright Act, the right referred to in the first paragraph 
sub a, may be waived. The rights referred to sub b and c may be waived in so far as alterations to 
the work or its title are concerned.  
 
In order to mitigate the scope of the moral right, courts often have recourse to a construction of 
an implied waiver. This is dealt with under Question 6. 
 
 
 
4. Which is the term of protection of the moral rights in your 
country?   
 
Is it identical to the term of protection of the economic rights?  Can the moral rights be exercised 
after the death of the author and by whom? Are works in the public domain still somehow 
protected under moral rights? 
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4.1 Term of protection of the moral right 
 
The duration of the moral right is governed by the same rules as the duration of the exploitation 
right, and will therefore not exceed the term of 70 years p.m.a. This not only follows from Article 
25, para. 2 and 4, providing that “after the death of the maker and until the copyright expires,” 
the moral rights rest with the person that the maker has designated by testamentary disposition; 
it also follows from the system of Dutch copyright, in which moral rights are introduced as one of 
the exceptions to the exploitation right. 
 
As it is, the moral rights will most often expire earlier, together with the life of the author. In 
order to be exercised post mortem, the author must, by testamentary disposition, designate a 
person who is to exercise the rights after his death. Most authors – and most notaries – are not 
aware of this rule. The consequences may be tragic.
110
 Until 1972, the moral right expired with 
the death of the author. The bill of 1972 saw that in the absence of a testamentary disposition, 
the heirs would be entitled to exercise the moral right, but Parliament objected and the law was 
amended. The new regulation, entered into force on 7 January 1973,
111
 was immediately 
criticized by Sjoerd Gerbrandy in his handbook on copyright which appeared in 1973.
112
 In 1998 
however, Herman Cohen Jehoram, a great opponent of the droit moral post mortem, stated with 
satisfaction that in an international perspective, in relation to the moral rights after death the 
Netherlands “occupied an utmost minimalistic position.”
113
 
 
The system of the Dutch Copyright Act has been criticized, also for its probable non-conformity 
with the Berne Convention.
114
 As far as foreign authors are concerned, the courts sometimes 
avoid the application of the Dutch system by applying the rule of locus regit actum as conflict 
rule for the whole regime of the succession. This was done by the District Court of Amsterdam  in 
a case in which the widow of the German composer Carl Orff invoked moral rights against a 
house music adaptation of the work of her late husband.
115
 
 
 
5. Other types of rights  
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(such as “personality rights”, “civil rights”, “publicity rights”, “portrait rights” or other, depending 
on the jurisdiction) complement the protection of the moral rights in copyright? 
 
The Netherlands protect other types of rights like personality rights, publicity rights, portrait 
rights and others. 
 
 
 
6. mitigating mechanisms for the abusive exercise of the 
moral rights  
 
Three legal instruments form the main tools to mitigate the scope of moral rights and prevent 
abusive exercise. The most basic one is the test of reasonableness contained in several – but not 
all – provisions of Article 25. The right to oppose mutilation and impairment is not subject to a 
test of reasonableness, but the requirement that these must be prejudicial to the honour and 
reputation of the author is very commonly used as a correction in cases where it is found that 
demands of the author or his heirs are exaggerated.  
Last but not least,  circumstances pointing at the existence of an implied waiver may be used 
either as an argument to support that the claim to a moral right is unreasonable or that a certain 
action is not prejudicial for the reputation, or else be used by the courts as a direct argument in 
order to mitigate claims based on moral rights.  
Apart from these instruments, the possibility always exists of a defense based on abuse of 
power. However, this is rarely seen in the field of moral rights, which might be explained by the 
existence of the other available possibilities, which prove reliable. 
 
6.1 The test of reasonableness in the Copyright Act 
 
According to Article 25, para. 1(a), the maker cannot oppose the making public of the work 
without mention of his name or other indication as maker, where such opposition would be 
unreasonable.  
According to Article 25, para. 1(c), the maker cannot oppose an alteration made to the work, 
where the nature of the alteration is such that opposition would be unreasonable.  
 
 
6.2 The requirement of prejudice to honour and reputation as a means to 
balance interests 
 
According to Article 25, para. 1(d) of the Copyright Act, the maker of the work has the right to 
oppose any distortion, mutilation or other impairment of the work that could be prejudicial to 
the reputation or name of the maker or to his dignity as maker.  
 41 
 
As will have transpired, Dutch courts have shown extreme care in trying to reach an equitable 
balance between the justified interests of authors on the one hand and owners and users of 
works on the other hand. It must be stressed that if the courts mitigate moral rights, it is not 
done at their own discretion but on the basis of the law. It is the Copyright Act itself which 
subjects the moral rights of integrity and paternity to a condition of reasonableness and the right 
to oppose mutilations and impairments to the requirement that these must be prejudicial to the 
honour and reputation of the author.  
 
i. Practical circumstances which either reduce or increase the risk of prejudice to the reputation 
of the author 
 
Moral rights may be mitigated on the ground of a number of circumstances. Often these might 
be interpreted as an implied waiver. 
  
The nature of the work 
The nature of the work is one of them. The work may be of a modest level of creativity,
116
 or 
made to serve a practical purpose
117
 or a purpose of light entertainment
118
 which may at a 
certain moment in time require its restoration and/or adaptation; the owner must be free to do 
so within reasonable limits.
119
 Or, authors who create advertising material for commercial parties 
must accept that the other party may require certain alterations. Thirdly, if a work is destined to 
be used in a trivial environment like business, trade or industry this might limit the right to 
oppose the placing of that work in a certain environment even if this is up to a certain extent 
derogatory as to its qualities as a design.
120
 For example, it was considered that authors of the 
design of bank notes destined to fulfil the useful function of money cannot always oppose partial 
reproduction or use without the mention of their name, as in the case of use in advertising as a 
symbol of money.
121
 The District Court of The Hague was in 2002 of the opinion that a mutilation 
will less readily occur in the case of mass products than in the case of authentic objects of art of 
which only one or a few copies exist.
122
 
 
The law of obligations 
The contractual relation between the maker and the owner is another one. For example, the 
author who consents to the making of a cinematographic adaptation will have to accept certain 
alterations.
123
 In a conflict between the city of Haarlem and visual artist Klingers, who opposed 
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the removal from a playground of certain of his works, it was considered that the artist could 
have understood from the start that the works created by him for the playground would not stay 
there indefinitely.
124
 
 
Employment contracts. Moral rights with ‘fictive authors’? 
According to Article 7 of the Dutch Copyright Act, the employer is considered as ‘the maker’ of 
the work. It is still debated in the Netherlands whether the allocation with the employer on the 
basis of Article 7 Copyright Act also entails an allocation of the moral right with the employer. As 
yet, there exists no decision of the Supreme Court providing clarity on this issue.
125
  
 
The same applies as to Article 8, which provides that “a public institution, an association, a 
foundation or a company that makes a work public as its own, without naming any natural 
person as the maker, is taken to be the maker of that work, unless it is proved that in the 
circumstances the making public of the work was unlawful. » Here however, consistent case law 
at the level of the Courts of appeal rejects the allocating the moral right with the ‘fictive 
maker’.
126
 
 
Even if it would be assumed that the moral rights stay with the employee, it remains that an 
employment contract will most often entail a renunciation, to a (very) large extent, of these 
moral rights. This follows from a number of circumstances. More often than not the work will be 
published without the name of the author – (tacitly) having waived this moral right, the author 
will find this circumstance in turn also affect the scope of his right of integrity, as it means that 
the bond between the work and the maker will be less strong and the reputation of the author 
will be less likely to be damaged. The personal bond between the author and the work might also 
be diluted by circumstances such as that under the employment contract, the author has to 
follow the instructions of the employer regarding the work, or cooperates with one or more 
other persons providing creative input, or primarily follows the prevailing trend and fashion. 
 
Destination of the work 
A third circumstance which might reduce the moral right may result from certain limitations 
ensuing from the public the work is destined for: if it turns out that a work destined for a home 
for the elderly,
127
 a children’s hospital
128
 or a crematorium
129
 shocks or profoundly disturbs the 
public it is destined to, the author must suffer that it is removed. 
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Absence of mentioning of the name of the author: interaction with integrity right 
If it seems certain that the mentioning of the name of the author in relation to a modified or 
mutilated work will add to the risk of prejudice to his reputation, this may entice into assuming 
that conversely, absence of any mention of the name could appreciably reduce this risk and 
therefore neutralize, at least partly, the infringement of the integrity right. This argument must 
however be handled with particular care, especially when it is used in connection with 
reproductions and adaptations by third parties. It is in no way excluded that the presence on the 
market of inferior imitations might very well affect the originality, freshness and status of the 
original work, as well as the reputation of its author.  
 
Nonetheless, in a case in which it did find infringement of the exploitation right, the District 
Court of Arnhem
130
 assumed that the integrity right was not at stake, because the imitation had 
not been marketed under the name of the author; that, therefore, the public would not associate 
the infringement with her; and that there consequently had been no prejudice to the reputation 
of the author. If the court meant to say that the absence of the mentioning of the name 
categorically excludes the possibility of an infringement of the right of integrity, this is certainly 
too absolute. Perhaps the President only meant to say that the judicial sanctions on the basis of 
the infringement of the exploitation right might suffice to also sanction the infringement of the 
moral right.  
 
In addition (and as a side remark), it is obvious that in cases which do not concern identical 
reproduction, it would be strange to blame the defendant for (also) infringing the paternity right 
by omitting the name of the author. Such a claim was rightly rebutted by the District Court of 
Amsterdam.
131
 
 
Wear & tear, costs, normative Kraft des Faktischen 
When the state of the material copy of the work has deteriorated as a consequence of natural 
decay or wear, accidents or vandalism, this may put limits to the possibility to claim that it be 
restored to its initial state, especially when this entails high costs.
132
 Such circumstances may 
often appear in an alliance with what Kabel has characterized as the normative power of the 
factual:
133
 infringers may often confront an author with a situation which is so difficult or costly 
to redress, that in the end, the judge nilly-willy accepts the status quo and the author is granted 
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only inferior measures, such as the payment of damages and/or the obligation for the other 
party not to mention the name of the author in relation to the work. 
 
Circumstances which facilitate invoking the moral right. Status of work and author. 
On the other hand, within these same categories plenty of circumstances can be imagined which 
may form a counterbalance to these mitigations and enhance the possibility to successfully 
invoke the moral right. One can mention the high degree to which the name and reputation of 
the artist may be attached to the work, the important role and status of the work in the oeuvre 
of the author
134
 or the high artistic status of the maker and/or the work.
135
 For example, if a 
commissioning party explicitly orders a work of a certain artistic status, he will have to bear the 
responsibilities ensuing from that status as to its maintenance and preservation.
136
 
 
Extent and scale of alterations 
Hardly surprisingly, the extent to which the form of a work is affected and the scale of the 
alterations inflicted on it play an important role;
137
 in many of the cases where the maker 
successfully invoked the right of integrity, large scale alterations were at stake.
138
 
 
Destination of the work 
Thirdly, the destination of the work can help to reinforce the integrity right – it is not 
unimaginable that the blue carpets which were considered incompatible with Irene Verbeek’s 
ceiling paintings in the municipal theatre in Groningen, would have been seen with a more 
forgiving eye by the court if a less ‘cultural’ place and public were concerned. 
 
Nature of the work and degree of divulgation 
The nature of the owner of the work may also play a role: public institutions, and more in 
particular cultural and academic ones, could be subject to a special duty of care and respect. 
Also, the degree of divulgation of the work is not unimportant. If a work still lingers half way 
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between a real divulgation and the ‘phase intime’, the moral right may be of another and more 
constraining nature than when it has moved far along the way of the ‘phase du don’.
139
 
 
 
ii.  The legal and doctrinal basis for creating a balance of interests 
 
As early as in 1974, when case law about the integrity right had hardly started to emerge, Bob 
Wachter remarked in a visionary note in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie that ‘it is clear that the 
situation in which the moral rights to an immaterial product of the mind and the rights in the 
material object itself are not united in one person, must lead to a weighing of interests.’
140
 
Indeed, the moral right would turn into a tyrannical instrument if the reasonable needs of legal 
owners and users of the work were not to be taken into account. This readiness to take into 
account the various interests involved is also favoured by the Dutch tradition of practical 
solutions, even more when these solutions help to facilitate trade. Also, a refusal to weigh the 
interests involved would hardly be conceivable in a system which, as from the introduction of the 
new Civil Code in 1992, has made of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ the leading principle of its 
whole law of obligations.
141
  
 
Although the jurisprudence concerning moral rights naturally is casuistic, several decades of 
developing case law reveal with ever more clarity some general guidelines for the weighing of 
the interests of the parties concerned. This development shows that moral rights are not a 
vague, unpredictable and capricious element jeopardizing the commercial interests of exploiters, 
but that they can function as a stable and equitable component of the system of copyright 
protection as a whole. 
 
The law: right to oppose alterations subjected to a condition of reasonableness 
Against this background, Dutch authors generally show satisfaction with the reasonableness 
clause contained in Article 25, paragraph 1(c) of the Copyright Act with regard to the author’s 
right to oppose alterations. However, a similar clause does not exist with regard to the right to 
oppose mutilations and other impairments. Some claim that as the text of the law does not 
repeat the condition of reasonableness in case the author opposes a mutilation, it clearly follows 
that in such cases a weighing of interests must be excluded. Kabel fears that the integrity right 
may be sapped if a balancing of interests is allowed even in the presence of a very serious 
impairment as ‘mutilation’.
142
 Cohen Jehoram likewise is of the opinion that in case of mutilation, 
a weighing of interests is not allowed;
143
 nevertheless, the same author argues that an author 
cannot oppose alterations necessary to keep an (architectural) work usable, even if these 
affected the representative character the architect intended to give to that building.
144
 
Occasionally, case law has followed the same approach, notably also the Court of Appeal of 
                                                           
139
 Term from the Doyen René Savatier, Le droit de l’art et des lettres, Paris 1953, p. 21.  
140
 Bob Wachter, note on Dutch Supreme Court 22 June 1973, Patrimonium v. Heirs of Reijers, (placing of the 
sculpture ‘The Hands’) NJ 1974, 61. 
141
 Articles 3:12, 6:2 and 6:248 Civil Code.  
142
 J. Kabel, note on President of the District Court Rotterdam, 10 September 1998, Struycken v. NAI, IER 1999, 
no. 3 p. 22. 
143
 Herman Cohen Jehoram, AMI 1988, p. 131. 
144
 Herman Cohen Jehoram, note on President of the District Court Leeuwarden, 12 July 1988, AMI 1989, p. 17. 
 46 
Leeuwarden on 17 March 1999 in the notorious case of Bonnema v. SBB.
145
 In paragraph 9 of that 
judgment, the Court of Appeal found that Article 25, paragraph 1(d) did not allow for a weighing 
of interests as it protected the maker of a work whenever prejudice could be caused to his 
honour and reputation in that quality. However, subsequently the Court of Appeal considered 
that the question whether such prejudice was likely to be caused, depended on the question 
whether the third party could invoke a due cause for his acts with regard to the work. By thus 
interposing the requirement of a due cause, the Court of Appeal comes quite close to what 
seems to be a weighing of interests. 
Still, other authors as Rob Du Bois, are of the opinion that an absolute right to oppose mutilation 
would lead to an ‘overstraining of the idea of copyright’.
146
  
 
The courts: prejudice to the reputation as a test of reasonableness  
The impression is that a majority of case law seeks a way out by verifying whether, in case of a 
mutilation or impairment of the work, these are of a nature as to cause prejudice to the honour 
or reputation of the author.
147
  
 
One could ponder whether this comes down, after all, to a simple weighing of interests or 
whether this ‘setting’ within the context of ‘honour and reputation’ to some extent protects 
authors against an all too laxist erosion of the integrity right into an interest like all others (and 
perhaps inferior to many others). Jan Kabel, who is sternly opposed to a simple weighing of 
interests, has taken an indulgent position vis-à-vis this test of prejudice to honour and 
reputation.
148
 
  
A test of prejudice to honour and reputation might indeed lead to slightly different results than a 
simple weighing of interests. Great financial losses for the exploiter might as such be of more 
importance in a general weighing of interests than in the specific context of the honour and 
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reputation of the author. However, two remarks must be made. The first is that Dutch courts, in 
line with the sad reputation of the Dutch nation on this point, tend to take pecuniary interests 
very seriously  – even if they fully endorse moral rights of authors. Secondly, the pecuniary 
element might (tacitly) be reintroduced in the honour and reputation approach. For example, 
one could imagine courts would consider that, in view of the considerable investments to be 
made by the defendant, the author should have observed special care in specifying the 
boundaries of the adaptation he allowed, in the absence of which even rather intensive 
adaptations must be held to be allowed. 
 
Why the right to oppose mutilation is subject to a test of reasonableness 
The question remains whether in view of the wording of the law, which does introduce a 
requirement of reasonableness in case the author opposes alterations but fails to subject cases 
of mutilation to that same test, a possibility exists for the introduction of a test of 
reasonableness via the ‘back door’ of the concept of honour and reputation. Here, such a 
possibility is sustained, in the light of the system of the law.  
The cause of the dispute on this point may partly be due to the fact that the system of the law is 
not very clear in this case. In fact, if the work is mutilated, it must in principle be assumed that 
this constitutes a – drastic and defacing – alteration which the author can always oppose in all 
reasonableness. Consequently, this situation would already be covered by the basic right to 
oppose alterations, and the special provision on mutilations would be redundant. However, it is 
not.  
 
The key to the special function of the right to oppose mutilation can be found in paragraph 3 of 
Article 25, from which it follows that the author can renounce the right to oppose alterations, 
but not the right to oppose mutilations. This results in a system of three stages of ‘alteration’: 
firstly, alterations of the work which the author cannot oppose at all, because such opposing 
would be unreasonable; secondly, (more serious) alterations of a nature he can oppose, unless 
he has – either tacitly or expressly – waived the right to oppose them; thirdly, alterations 
amounting to a mutilation of the work, which mutilation is of a nature as to be prejudicial to the 
honour and reputation of the artist; the right to oppose these cannot be waived.  
 
Arguably, the first situation will most often occur in cases where the author has granted a simple 
right of reproduction, distribution and/or communication to the public. As in these situations, 
the author has allowed no more than a simple right to use, which right to use does not include a 
right of adaptation, he can oppose every alteration unless it concerns negligible alterations and 
opposing them would really be unreasonable. However, the author has the right to go further 
and allow more intrusive alterations, not only when these are more or less inevitable – which 
may occur in the case that the author of a novel grants permission for a cinematographic 
adaptation of that work – but also in other cases. However, the law contains this right within the 
‘frontiers’ of a mutilation which is prejudicial to the honour and reputation of the author. Beyond 
those frontiers, his right to oppose changes with regard to the work remains intact. 
 
This reveals the ambiguity of the situation the provision with regard to ‘mutilations’ has to deal 
with. It concerns cases in which, either expressly or implicitly, the author has consented to some 
degree of adaptation of the work. Moreover, the boundaries of this consent may be difficult to 
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identify. Therefore, the right of integrity retreats to its core value. It protects neither the work as 
such, nor the reputation of the artist as such, but the bond between them. Consequently, the 
integrity right will be at risk, not by the fact of the mutilation alone, but only if this mutilation 
also is likely to adversely affect the reputation of the author. It is felt that Article 25 paragraph 
1(d) thus creates a reasonable compromise. In case an author has given his consent to an 
adaptation without clearly delimiting its boundaries, this will grant a rather large margin to 
exploiters. But if the adaptation goes very far and amounts to a mutilation, and if, moreover, 
none of the circumstances justify such mutilation so that the author has reason to fear that it will 
prejudice his reputation in the eyes of an (objective) user of the work, the integrity right will be 
activated, even if the consequences would be rather burdensome for the exploiter. 
 
‘Impairments’ 
Apart from mutilation, the Dutch term ‘aantasting’ (impairment) in Article 25, paragraph 1(d) 
also covers the case of, in the wording of the Berne Convention, ‘any other derogatory action’ in 
relation to the work. It is more or less generally accepted that this form of impairment concerns 
cases in which the work as such is left intact, but changes are brought to its context or 
environment, which might adversely affect its status and the honour and reputation of the 
author. Like in the case where the author has consented to an adaptation, the fact that the work 
as such is left untouched introduces a certain ambiguity in the situation. The integrity of the work 
as such is respected; therefore the arguments of the author to oppose the use must be 
particularly strong. For even if it is clear that it may be damaging to work and author when a 
work is presented in a morally or physically derogatory context, the integrity right should not 
grow into a general privilege to govern the environment of works of art; the rights of third 
parties should be carefully observed where the impairing element must be located outside the 
body of the work as such.  
 
Prejudice to honour and reputation as an objectified legal concept 
The impression is that in most cases, the test of prejudice to the honour and reputation of the 
author is applied in an objectified way. It thereby has acquired the nature of a legal concept 
rather than a factual criterion.
149
 Indeed it is probably the best way to look at this concept.
150
 A 
factual test as opposed to a legal criterion could make the right degenerate, as is illustrated by 
Court of Appeal of The Hague 11 November 1999, Shell v. De la Haye, AMI 2000, p. 15, in which 
opposition against an alleged impairment of the work was dismissed, inter alia because the court 
found that this action would not negatively influence the recognition the well-known designer 
already enjoyed with colleagues in design circles.
151
 The opinion is that this criterion can hardly 
lead to satisfying results. Not only colleagues, but also the public at large could maintain full 
confidence in an author’s reputation even in case of quite revolting mutilations of certain works, 
so that the author could not oppose deformations he should be able to oppose. The other way 
round, a reputation could be damaged by actions which are nevertheless objectively necessary 
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and justified. Under the subjective and factual angle chosen by the Court of Appeal, there would 
be an infringement of the moral rights; whereas it seems a better solution to tolerate 
deformations of functional objects which are justified on objective ground – including, of course, 
the ground that there is no reasonable and less mutilating alternative.  
 
Therefore, it is felt that the test whether a mutilation of impairment can be prejudicial to the 
honour and reputation of the maker must be of an objectified and normative nature. The author 
should not be obliged to prove actual damage to his reputation. It suffices if the work is 
mutilated or impaired in a way which objectively causes a reasonable risk of damage to his 
reputation.  
 
Whether or not there is a due cause for behaviour which would otherwise constitute an 
infringement of the integrity right, may often coincide with what the parties may reasonably 
expect from each other on the basis of a contract they entered into. However contradictory and 
illogical from a legal point of view, in practice the rule is that actions which, by normal standards, 
would constitute a mutilation (the right to oppose which can consequently not be waived), can 
turn into a simple alteration by the mere fact that the author consciously waives his rights in 
respect of such actions! However, there are limits to this practice. There is a point beyond which 
the text of the law applies and waiver simply is excluded,
152
 no matter what contractual 
agreements the parties engage into; otherwise Article 25, paragraph 3 would be devoid of 
substance.
153
 Perhaps, the contractual and the legal border to waiver lie not so far apart. Under 
contract law, agreements in which authors contractually consent to mutilations so serious that 
the exploiter may not reasonably rely on the conclusion that this corresponds to the actual will of 
the author, may not be binding. 
 
Proof of prejudice to honour and reputation 
If the above is right, the mutilation as such would in principle also constitute prejudice to the 
honour and reputation of the maker, unless there is a due cause for the mutilation in the form of 
a contract or other circumstances.
154
 The District Court of Amsterdam seemed to follow this 
reasoning in a case where it stated that the prejudice to the reputation followed from the – 
various – infringements and that simply challenging that prejudice without further explanation 
would not hold.
155
 At this point however, the opinions differ. In his – critical – accompanying 
note, Spoor challenges the prejudice to the reputation and the mutilation each and 
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independently. Likewise, Judica Krikke chided the District Court of Groningen
156
 for not making 
separate considerations as to the question whether the mutilation which was found in that case 
moreover risked to cause prejudice to the reputation of the author. However, in the light of the 
reasoning followed above, such considerations should perhaps be read in the reasons given for 
the finding of a mutilation, in particular where the court states, in paragraph 2.6 of the judgment, 
that the work occupies an important place in the oeuvre of the artist and has been described in a 
brochure.   
 
 
 
 
7. Conflicts between the exercise of a moral right and other 
proprietary rights on the “carrier” of the work 
 
(e.g. mention of the name of the author on a building, modification of a utilitarian work, 
demolition of an artistic work, graffiti on a building,…) 
 
Demolition as  an unlawful act: Miletic 
As has been observed in relation to other more controversial exercises of the moral right, the 
courts first approached the subject from the angle of unlawful conduct. In 1975, the Hoge Raad 
ruled in the case of Miletic. During a long absence in his home country, the municipality of 
Amsterdam had vacated the atelier it rented out to  the Yugoslavian (we write 1970) artist and 
sculptor Slawomir Miletic. When he returned, the bewildered artist discovered that his works 
had been removed and subsequently stored by the municipal cleansing department. His entire 
oeuvre lay in ruin. Miletic accused the municipality; the municipality pretended that this was the 
condition in which the works had been found; the contrary was hard to prove. Eventually, the 
Court of Appeal of Amsterdam at least in part found that there was unlawful conduct on the part 
of the municipality. The case led to no less than two appeals in cassation. In the second of these 
appeals, the Dutch supreme court enigmatically remarked:
157
  “It is possible that such conduct 
also provides a ground to grant compensation for other damages than financial loss,  in particular 
when those actions also amount to an “impairment” of those works of art in the sense of Article 
25, first paragraph, introduction and under c), of the Copyright Act, and consequently of the 
personality right of the maker meant there. However, the getting lost of those works of art as a 
consequence of an unlawful conduct by the municipality will not be enough.” 
 
Demolition as an infringement of the moral right? The debate.  
For a long time it was very much debated whether the author’s droit au respect included the 
right to object against destruction of the work.
158
  
 
A minority in the doctrine, supported by some case law, sustained that destruction or demolition 
did not only mean an impairment of the work, but that moreover the prejudice to the honour or 
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reputation of the author required by Article 25(1)(d) was, in principle, brought about by the act 
of destruction as such.
159
 The supporters of this view submitted that, unlike the right to object 
against alterations not amounting to a mutilation in Article 25, para. 1 under c, the right to object 
against mutilations and other impairments was not subject to a supplementary test of 
reasonableness and fairness. Therefore, it was considered that the rights of the artists had 
priority, only limited by the doctrine of abuse of copyright. Although under Dutch law the 
possibility to apply the general doctrine of abuse of a right is not theoretical at all, the system of 
private law required rather exceptional circumstances to successfully invoke it, so that there 
seemed to be little reason to fear that the exercise by artists of their moral rights would be 
considered to constitute an abuse. 
  
The other extreme was also supported: authors could never oppose destruction and demolition 
of their work on the basis of the moral right, because the destruction excluded as such the 
possibility of any prejudice to the honour or reputation of the author.
160
 In this view, prejudice to 
the honour or reputation of the author could only be caused where a work was presented to the 
public in a distorted or mutilated way. As the public could have no access in whatever way to a 
work after destruction or demolition, the risk was excluded that the work would reach the public 
in a state or form the author had not intended. There was no risk of a ‘false impression’ with the 
public and, consequently, no risk of prejudice to the honour or reputation of the maker.
161
  
 
The majority of courts
162
 and authors
163
 adopted a view which formed a compromise between 
the two extremes: the destruction as such would not suffice for a successful action based on the 
integrity right, but it was required that this destruction materially caused prejudice to the honour 
and reputation of the author. Such prejudice to the honour and reputation was not caused were 
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there was a ‘gegronde reden’, a ‘due reason’ for demolition. If the demolition or destruction was, 
by all reasonable standards, justified or even inevitable, it was considered difficult to imagine 
how this could (illicitly) cause prejudice to the honour and reputation of the author. On the other 
hand, a more or less needless destruction of a work could make the impression that it concerned 
a disposable without value and might therefore be a derogatory action.
164
 In practice, this meant 
that the exercise of the right to object to destruction was subject to a weighing of interests. 
Reasonable practical interests of owners or users would have priority over the artistic interests of 
the author, but in some cases the moral right would prevail and in others, a compromise was 
found in the form of a financial indemnification for the author.  
 
The abovementioned ‘due reason doctrine’ developed by the lower courts, although widely 
applied, had never been legitimized by a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court, so that the 
possibility continued to exist that the majority opinion was not the correct one. During the 
eighties and nineties, an ever-increasing flow of case law developed around the role of the droit 
au respect in the case of destruction, so that the existing uncertainty began to make itself felt. 
Therefore, it came as a relief when on 6 February 2004, the Dutch Supreme Court finally ruled on 
the question.
165
  
 
Advocate General Verkade strongly advised against the application of the criterion of prejudice 
to the honour and reputation of the author, criticizing it for its vagueness and considering that it 
would not be fit to protect against excessive claims.
166
 Nonetheless, the judgment turned out less 
unequivocal than many might have hoped for. As to the possibility as such to invoke the right of 
integrity against the destruction of a work the Hoge Raad was unambiguous:  
 
“The total destruction of an object in which a work of authorship is embodied, cannot be qualified 
as an impairment of the work forbidden by the Copyright Act 1912.” 
 
However, destruction can amount to abuse of power or otherwise be unlawful:  
 
“That does not mean that the owner of an object (including immovable objects) in which a work of 
authorship is embodied – a copy of the work – always is free to abandon that work to destruction 
and that the interests of the author are always second to the power to dispose of the owner. 
Indeed, the destruction of a copy of the work can amount to abuse of power in the cases as meant 
in art. 3:13, par. 2 Civil Code, or otherwise be unlawful against the author.” 
 
Therefore, in exchange for the elimination of the action based on copyright, the Hoge Raad offers 
an alternative based on general private law. The alternative could have been little more than a 
theoretical palliative in view of the fact that abuse of power under Article 3:13, para. 2 BW 
normally is subject to the heavy condition that the owner, taking into consideration the 
disproportion between the interest in exercising the right and the interest which is prejudiced by 
this exercise, reasonably could not have come to this exercise. But from what follows, it appears 
that a realistic alternative to the integrity right is offered, the exercise of which depends on 
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conditions amazingly similar to the doctrine developed by the lower courts in relation to the right 
of integrity: 
 
“Even a third party who destroys such an object can act unlawfully towards the author. Such abuse 
or otherwise unlawful behaviour will occur sooner to the extent that less copies of the work exist. 
As far as it concerns unique copies, as will most often be the case with regard to buildings, it can 
under certain circumstances be required from the owner that he only proceeds to destruction if a 
due reason therefore exists and if he respects the justified interests of the author at least in so far 
as, if requested, he takes care to have the building duly documented, or at least offers the author 
the opportunity to take the necessary measures for this himself.” 
 
The importance of this must not be underestimated. As Van Maanen and Quanjel Schreurs have 
signalled, it means that in relation to works of literature and art, the whole doctrine of abuse of 
power must be interpreted in a specific, milder sense.
167
 The requirement that the property to be 
destroyed must be duly documented, is just one example which hardly can be imagined in the 
traditional context of abuse of power. 
 
The relative ambiguity on the level of the practical rule governing destruction thus introduced 
should not hide the potential significance of the case at a systematic level. The decision shows 
how close the relation tends to be which Dutch law construes between general private law and 
the exercise of the moral rights. Bob Wachter, in his important note on Patrimonium v. Heirs 
Reijers already quoted, perceived the moral right as a limitation of the rights of the owner, just as 
the property right could be limited by other existing mechanisms of private law. In Jelles v. 
Zwolle, the Hoge Raad of the Netherlands, although – whether rightly or not – fearing that the 
exercise of the integrity right against destruction might lead to results which are too ‘absolute’, 
nevertheless acknowledges the same principle that the right of the owner may be limited by the 
interests of the creative maker. It is no more than a gradual shift from one legal instrument, 
which looks sterner, to another, which might offer more space for a weighing of interests. 
 
The practical way in which the Wavin case worked out however weakened the position of 
authors. Courts started to reason that if demolition of a work of art is no infringement of the 
moral right, it can be an alternative for owners who refuse to maintain the work in a good state, 
the last being an infringement.
168
 The Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden
169
 ruled, technically 
correct, that the maker invoking abuse of power against an owner who wishes to remove a work 
will carry the heavy burden of proof that his interests as a maker are harmed in a 
disproportionate way. In this case, the costs of restoration and maintenance of the work of art 
proved to be more expensive than its realization. Also under the former doctrine of the integrity 
right, these circumstances would have made rather uncertain whether the author could have 
been successful in this case. However, proof that one´s interests as a maker are harmed in a 
disproportionate way may still be very difficult to prove ibn other cases where makers would 
have been much surer of success under the former doctrine. 
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8. Conflicts between moral rights and the right to freedom 
of expression/ other fundamental rights  
 
 
That a conflict between the right of freedom of expression and the exercise of moral rights is far 
from unimaginable was illustrated in 2003 in by the Scientology case.  
 
As was mentioned when dealing with the divulgation right, Article 15a, para. 1 requires for a 
lawful quotation that the work has legally been published. Likewise, Article 16, para 1 allows the 
use of works for the purpose of illustration for teaching, on the condition that the work has been 
lawfully made public. Many or most authors relate the criterion that the work has legally been 
published to the moral right.
170
  
 
However, as was already observed above, the condition that the work has lawfully been made 
public is open to various interpretations. In a first interpretation, there only would be a legal 
publication when the work is made available in print to the general public. This would entail 
sharp limitations for the freedom to quote and therefore for the freedom of expression. In a 
second interpretation, closer to the moral right spirit of the right of divulgation, the work would 
have to be considered as legally published as soon as it leaves, with his permission, the intimate 
sphere of the author. That is far from requiring a publication aiming at the general public.  
 
In re Scientology, decided in 2003 by the Court of Appeal of The Hague,
171
 the artist and publicist 
Karin Spaink had published, on internet, large fragments of the ‘religious’ texts and secrets of the 
Scientology Church, with the intention to demonstrate how aggressive and dangerous this 
institution was. The Church of Scientology wished to prohibit this making available to the public 
of its texts. Karin Spaink raised several defenses. She contended inter alia that the use she had 
made of the texts was justified by the quotation right. The Court of Appeal of The Hague ruled 
however, that the condition that the work had legally been published meant that it must have 
been published in print. As with regard to the texts of Scientology, this was not the case, so that 
despite the fact that it had been established that at least 35.000 persons had been offered 
access to the works, they were considered not to have been published. Commentators were 
divided as to whether the decision should be approved of or not.
172
  
 
The Court of Appeal subsequently proceeded to the direct application of Article 10 ECHR, 
guaranteeing the freedom of expression, in order to allow the publication on internet after all. 
However, some authors raised the question whether the interest in the freedom of expression 
should not already be taken into account as an interpretative principle
173
 at an earlier stage, in 
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establishing what is meant by the condition that the work has legally been published. Instead of 
only consulting, as the Court of Appeal did, the Berne Convention and the Dutch Copyright Act, 
the European Convention should not have been disregarded. In view of the freedom of 
expression, it is very well conceivable that a work must be considered as legally published once 
the author allows it to leave his intimate circle. Several courts had already decided in this 
sense.
174
  
 
In his Conclusion of 18 March 2005 in this case for the Supreme Court,
175
 Advocate-General 
Verkade, whilst admitting that the requirement that the work had legally been made public 
followed from the moral right, interpreted the requirement as one referring to a publication 
aiming at the general public. Verkade based his choice on the legislative history, in which it was 
remarked that the quotation right was not meant to apply to manuscripts or to works for a 
restricted public.
176
 The A-G added that the view taken by the legislator should perhaps be 
reconsidered, but that the choice he made in 1985 was not inconsistent. The negative 
consequences of this choice could be remedied by allowing a not too narrow possibility of 
recourse to Article 10 EHRM, which the A-G considered to offer better tailored criteria. 
 
What makes a publication legal? 
 
In the same procedure of Scientology, the interesting question was raised when a publication can 
be considered legal in the sense of Article 15a. Should this be restricted to the case that the 
author himself had granted permission, or could also publication without his permission, but 
allowed on the basis of a legal provision suffice? In the Scientology case, texts of the Scientology 
had been made available when in the U.S., the Fishman affidavit had been deposited for 
inspection with the court. 
 
It is interesting that the question could also be reversed. What if the authorities forbid the 
publication but the author allows it? In 2003, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam prohibited the 
publication of Dimitri Yemets’ Russian novel Tanja Grotter and the Magical Double Bass, which it 
considered to infringe J.K. Rowlings Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone. The prohibition of 
this satirical piece of Russian literature, written in an exuberant style and bulging with literary 
references to Greek and European mythology, would still be worth a public discussion;
177
 but 
would it be allowed to quote, in the Netherlands, from this work in order to corroborate one’s 
views ? It has never been published, and the prohibition to do so irrevocably applies! 
 
Freedom of Art 
The freedom of art may have played an underlying role a case concerning a production of the 
famous theatre play Waiting for Godot of Samuel Beckett, in which all male roles were played by 
female actors in travesty.
178
 Beckett was furiously opposed to this. The Dutch judge allowed the 
production. 
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9. How do authors exercise their moral rights in practice?   
 
Do they consider this a matter of importance?   
Yes. 
  
How do they want to be acknowledged (which modalities exist for the exercise of the rights of 
authorship and integrity)?   
Authors have the right to oppose to publication of their work without authorship credit unless 
this would be unreasonable. There are only few instances where authors have sued for not 
receiving authorship credit. Where authors sue for infringement of the economic rights, the fact 
that no authorship credit has been given may support the case for the plaintiff and increase 
damages. 
  
Authorship credit on TV becomes less and less common. Credit lines at the end of a motion 
picture often are short version, in many cases limited to the name of the production company 
and year of production. 
Credit on radio is mostly for the artist and hardly ever for the composer and lyricist. 
  
How do they impose respect of their moral rights when they are faced with derivative works?   
To the extent that their negotiating position allows for it, the contract with the publisher or 
producer may provide safeguards. If not, the author may invoke his right to object to 
modifications unless such objection is unreasonable (s. 25 sub c DCA), or his right to oppose to 
mutilations or other distortions of his work (s. 25(1)(d) DCA). 
  
Do licences (in particular via creative commons) commonly provide a prohibition to create 
derivative works?  
  
Are there in your country model contracts per sector (such as the literary, audiovisual, musical, 
graphic arts or artistic sectors) that are made available by professional organisations or by 
collective management organisations and that contain clauses regarding the moral rights?  If 
so, which ones?  
 
The model contract for original Dutch language literary works specifies how the author is 
credited in the work and provides that the author has the right to update the work if the 
publisher intends to publish a reprint or new version. 
The license terms of collective management organisation Buma Stemra for the digital distribution 
of music works provide that the moral rights of the authors must be respected.  
The license terms of collective management organisation Pictoright for the use of artistic and 
photographic works provide that the moral rights of the authors must be respected and that the 
licensee refrains from alteration, mutilation or other distortion of the work. 
 
 
10. Collective Management organisations  
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Do collective management organisations play a role in the exercise of the moral rights in your 
country?  
 
Collective management organisation Pictoright may as a service to its authors support authors in 
moral rights infringement claims. Pictoright also initiates lawsuits that may have both an 
economic and moral right aspect. Pictoright sued poster distribution company All Posters for 
selling canvas prints of existing posters (existing prints pressed on to canvas without actual 
copying). The case has been decided in two instances on the basis of the economic rights of 
reproduction and distribution. The Supreme Court referred questions to the ECJ regarding the 
exhaustion of the distribution right. HR 12 July 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:CA0265. 
Pictoright also sued art traders for selling art forgeries. 
 
 
 
11. particular forms of use  
 
In your country, is it provided in legislation, case law and/or scholarly literature how the moral 
rights apply with regard to particular forms of use, such as: 
 
“artistic quotation” 
user generated content 
folklore  
orphan works 
cloud computing 
alternative (free) licensing schemes (in particular open source licences or creative 
commons) 
international aspects (determination of jurisdiction and applicable law) 
 
The Copyright Act only contains a special provision on the last mentioned category: international 
aspects. Dating from 1912, it generally is considered outdated. 
 
The main Article concerning international aspects is Article 47: 
 
Article 47  
1. This Act applies to all literary, scientific or artistic works which have been first published in the 
Netherlands or have been published within 30 days of its first publication in another country, either 
before or after this Act’s entry into force, and also to all such works not published, or not thus 
published, the makers of which are Dutch nationals.  
2. For the purposes of the application of the preceding paragraph, makers who are not Dutch 
nationals but who are habitually resident in the Netherlands shall be equated with Dutch nationals 
in respect of unpublished works or works published after the maker has become habitually resident 
in the Netherlands.  
3. A work is published within the meaning of this Article when it has appeared in print with the 
consent of the maker or, in general, when the number of copies, of whatever kind, made available 
with the consent of the maker satisfythe reasonable requirements of the public, having regard to 
the nature of the work.  
4. The performance of a dramatic, dramatico-musical or musical work, the showing of a film work, 
the recitation or broadcasting in a radio or television programme of a work and the exhibition of a 
work of art is not regarded as a publication.  
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5. With regard to works of architecture and works of visual arts constituting an integral part thereof, 
the construction of the work of architecture or the installationof the work of visual art is regarded as 
publication.  
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, this Act applies to film works 
the producer of which has his seat or habitual residence in the Netherlands.  
 
 
12. The digital context  
 
The objective of certain moral rights appears to be changing in the digital context. The right of 
disclosure, which enables authors to decide when their works can be made public, is invoked at 
times to protect the confidentiality of certain kinds of content or data or their private 
dimension. The right to claim authorship (paternity) is changing into a right of attribution 
which places more emphasis on the identification of one contributor among others (for 
example, on Wikipedia or in free licences) than on recognition of authorship. Lastly, the right 
of integrity may become a right through which to protect a work’s authenticity. Indeed, while 
modifications to works are more and more widely authorised, authenticity is assuming greater 
importance, notably through the use of technological measures to guarantee it. In your 
country, are there any indications in legislation, case law and/or scholarly literature that the 
moral rights “shift” in a digital environment: 
 
From a divulgation right to a right to the protection of privacy (private life)? 
From a right to claim authorship (paternity) to a right to attribution? 
From an integrity right to a right to respect the authenticity of the work? 
Up to acknowledging similar interests and rights akin to moral rights for authors 
and performing artists, for the benefit of publishers, producers and broadcasters? 
 
 
Answer 
 
These subjects have, up to now, received limited attention in the Netherlands.  
 
The right of authenticity of authorship and work was dealt with in the Dutch National Report 
for ALAI in 1977.
179
 From this report, we quote:  
 
(p. 223) 
“[...] Dutch employers have not seemed to be inclined to effectively exercise the right of 
integrity. The reason that they are rather eager to keep their position as holders of the mral 
rights is not that they would have the intention to actually use those moral rights against 
third parties, but because they want to have absolute legal certainty that the empoloyees will 
not hinder the employer’s clients with claims based on copyright. [...] there has been a case 
of two free lancers who had designed Dutch banknotes for the Nederlandse Bank, the Dutch 
National Bank, invoking their moral rights against third parties who used the design of the 
banknotes for advertising purposes.
180
 Although the action was dismissed by the Court of 
Appeal, this is probably not an idea which will appeal to many employers.”  
 
(p. 226) 
                                                           
179
 In : Dellebeke (ed.), Copyright in Cyberspace/Le droit d’auteur en cyberspace, Amsterdam: Otto 
Cramwinckel 1997, p. 221-233 
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 Court of Appeals Arnhem 2 March 1993, OHRA v. Oxenaar en Kruit, Informatierecht AMI 1993, p. 90-93, 
note Grosheide 
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“Where a strong protection of the personal expression of an artist as such can be very 
desirable or at least harmless to other people’s interests, a protection of the same strength 
can, in a commercial context, hamper competition and even lead to monopolistic 
consequences. To the extent that the work has been more explicitly created as or changed 
into a mass product, market-oriented principles of competition law will be more likely to be 
applied; the moral aspect, and with it the moral right, shrinks in that scenario. 
 
[...]  in order to protect the legitimate interests of producers and employers with regard to 
the authenticity of authorship and work, other instruments of intellectual property are 
available. Instruments which more effectively than copyright take into account the genuine 
commercial nature of the interests underlying the right of authenticity. Especially trade mark 
law might offer more appropriate ways to afford protection for these interests. Where 
producers and employers put their name on the product, its is, in the majority of cases, not 
so much an indication of original authorship but a means of identifying the goods and/or 
providing an indication of their origin. Moreover, and this brings us closer to the functions of 
the moral right, such an indication, like a trade mark, offers ‘a guarantee that all good 
bearing it have been produced under the control of a single undertaking which is accountable 
for their quality’.
181
  One could replace ‘control’ by the word ‘authorship’ and ‘quality’ by 
‘authenticity of the work’ in order to illustrate that these concepts of trademark law and 
copyright law come, in a way, close together in this case: ‘works produced under the 
authorship of a single undertaking which is accountable for the authenticity of the work.’ 
 
Under the EEC Trademark Directive
182
 the trademark holder can supervise the condition of 
the goods which are sold under his trademark. In principle, the trademark right is exhausted 
once the goods have been put on the market in the Community by the proprietor of the 
trademark or with his consent (article 7(1) Trademark Directive). However, according to 
article 7 section 2, this rule shall not apply ‘where there exist legitimate reasons for the 
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition 
of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market.’ Whereas this 
provision takes into account the interests of the trademark holder, it does not exceed the 
limits of the commercial field. It grants no protection against changing or impairing goods, if 
the trademark (i.e. ‘the name of the producer/employer’) is not affixed to the goods. It does 
not provide protection against the use outside the course of trade, and in purely private 
situations. There is no obligation to mention the trademark in relation to the goods. Even so, 
the trademark holder enjoys, under modern trademark law, a very good protection which 
does not give rise to serious complaints. Moreover, favoured by modern theorie s on the 
function of the trademark, Benelux trademark law seems inclined to provide a protection of 
‘moral rights’ of the trademark holder, at least, to the extent that it protects the ‘integrity’ of 
the product’s image and its trademark.”   
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